Iran’s Nuclear Program in Geopolitical Context

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1. Strategic Logic Behind Iran’s Nuclear Posture

Iran’s nuclear posture is shaped by a complex deterrence logic that blends asymmetric tactics, threshold capabilities, and strategic ambiguity. The Islamic Republic has deliberately positioned itself as a “threshold nuclear power”, developing the materials and know-how needed for a weapon while stopping short of crossing the line into an overt arsenal[1]. This so-called “Japan option” allows Tehran to rapidly build nuclear weapons without actually doing so, remaining formally within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) even as it gains latent deterrence[1]. By mid-2024, Iran’s advances had shortened its estimated breakout time – the time to produce fissile material for a bomb – to under one week for a single weapon’s worth of uranium[13]. Such progress underscores Iran’s intent to maximize its security options: as one analysis notes, “As of mid-2024, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for one bomb in less than a week… for five weapons in about three weeks.”[13] This drastically compressed timeline gives Tehran bargaining leverage and a potent deterrent signal, even absent a tested warhead.

Deterrence through ambiguity. Tehran leverages ambiguity about its nuclear capability as a strategic tool. By maintaining ambiguity and refraining from an open weapons test, Iran seeks to reap the deterrent value of potential nuclear arms while minimizing the diplomatic and military blowback that a declared arsenal would provoke[1]. Iranian officials continue to insist their program is peaceful, yet the unprecedented 60% uranium enrichment and stockpile (over 120 kg, enough for nearly three bombs) tell a different story[1]. Iran remains “the only country enriching uranium at this level without a confirmed nuclear weapons program”, indicating an intentional threshold strategy[1]. This ambiguity extends to doctrine: Iran has no official nuclear doctrine, but hints at a contingent approach. In April 2024, a senior Revolutionary Guard commander, Ahmad Haghtalab – charged with protecting nuclear sites – warned that “the threats of the Zionist regime against Iran’s nuclear facilities make it possible to review our nuclear doctrine and deviate from our previous considerations”[2]. In effect, Iranian leaders signal that actual weaponization remains politically uncommitted but could be embraced swiftly if existential threats mount. This deliberate vagueness keeps adversaries uncertain and extends deterrence beyond mere capabilities.

Multi-domain and asymmetric deterrence. Iran’s deterrent strategy is not confined to the nuclear realm; it is integrated with a broad spectrum of asymmetric capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) plays a central role in projecting Iran’s power through missile forces, drones, and regional proxy networks. These tools create a multi-domain deterrent that complements the nuclear threshold stance. For example, Iran’s extensive ballistic missile program provides a delivery platform that could carry nuclear payloads in the future, enhancing the credibility of its latent deterrent. Iran’s defense doctrine explicitly embraces “active deterrence,” whereby Iran threatens predetermined counterattacks if attacked, thus reinforcing deterrence by raising the costs of aggression[1]. Tehran has demonstrated this active deterrence in practice: in April 2024, for the first time ever, Iran launched a massive direct missile and drone attack on Israel (dubbed “Operation True Promise”) in retaliation for an Israeli strike on Iranian personnel in Syria[15]. Over 300 projectiles were fired from Iranian soil at Israeli cities – a bold asymmetric riposte meant to signal that Iran will escalate horizontally (via missiles and proxies) if its core interests or territory are struck[15]. This unprecedented direct attack from Iran underscored its new willingness to use non-nuclear force as deterrent punishment, even against a nuclear-armed foe. Iranian commanders have openly warned Israel that any strike on Iranian nuclear facilities will be met with missile salvos against Israel’s own nuclear sites[2]. Such threats exemplify Iran’s attempt to deter via conventional retaliation while keeping the nuclear option in reserve.

Ideology and realpolitik both shape Tehran’s posture. The regime’s revolutionary ideology—encapsulated in slogans like “Death to America” and refusal to recognize Israel—might suggest an irrational zeal. However, in the nuclear realm Iran’s behavior has been largely pragmatic and security-driven. The Supreme Leader’s oft-cited fatwa against nuclear weapons (declaring them “haram”) provides ideological cover for restraint[2], yet Iran’s threshold strategy indicates a cold calculus of realpolitik: regime survival and deterrence against regime change are paramount objectives. As one U.S. analysis observed, “The main military task that would be achieved by an Iranian nuclear deterrent would be taking the threat of a preventive U.S. attack off the table.”[8] In other words, Iran’s leaders watched the fates of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi – who lacked nuclear deterrents – versus Kim Jong-un’s North Korea, which has survived under nuclear protection. This strategic lesson pushes Iran’s realpolitik interest in at least a latent nuclear capability. Even figures in Washington acknowledge Iran’s rational motive: “The best way for the regime surviving, in their mind, is having a nuclear weapon, because when you have a nuclear weapon, nobody attacks you,” U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham noted frankly[9]. Thus, despite revolutionary rhetoric, Iran’s nuclear posture is fundamentally defensive – a high-stakes insurance policy against foreign attack or coerced regime change[9].

At the same time, Tehran balances this survival logic with ideological narratives for domestic and Muslim-world audiences. The regime portrays its nuclear program as a symbol of technological self-sufficiency and resistance to Western “hegemonic” bullying. Iran’s leaders frame any potential compromise as a concession wrung from Western powers, not a surrender of principles. This tightrope act – blending “neither East nor West” revolutionary pride with pragmatic security needs – explains the nuanced ambiguity in Iran’s stance. In summary, Iran’s strategic logic is to push its nuclear development to the brink – maximizing deterrence by proximity to the bomb – while avoiding the costs of open proliferation. Integrated with missiles, drones, and militant proxies, and shrouded in doctrinal ambiguity, this posture seeks to deter enemies across multiple domains. It is a strategy that marries ideological defiance with the cold logic of realpolitik, calibrated to ensure the regime’s survival in a hostile environment.

2. Regional Security Architecture: Iran vs. the Arab Bloc

The Middle East’s security landscape in 2025 is defined by a sharpening contest between Iran and a loose coalition of Arab states increasingly aligned with Israel. This evolving regional security architecture pits Iran’s axis of influence against an Arab-Israeli bloc that has been solidifying through normalization agreements and shared threat perceptions. The result is a fractured region: on one side, Iran and its “Resistance Axis” of proxies; on the other, a U.S.-backed Sunni Arab camp tacitly partnering with Israel to counter Tehran. Understanding this dynamic requires mapping Iran’s spheres of influence and the countervailing alliances among Arab states.

As the map illustrates, Iran has, since the 1979 Revolution, built a network of militant proxies and partners across at least six countries. This includes Shi’a militias in Iraq (e.g. Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq), the Assad-aligned forces in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestinian territories, and the Houthi insurgents in Yemen. The IRGC’s elite Quds Force has armed, trained, and financed these groups, collectively known as the “Axis of Resistance,” to project Iranian power and challenge the Arab governments that align with the West. Through this axis, Iran seeks strategic depth: for example, Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal in Lebanon (estimated at over 130,000 missiles) directly threatens Israel, deterring attacks on Iran by raising the costs for Israel. Likewise, pro-Iran militias in Iraq and Syria provide Tehran with forward bases and a land corridor to the Levant. In Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthis have tied down Saudi Arabia in a costly war and even struck Emirati and Saudi targets with missiles and drones – a stark demonstration of Iran’s reach via proxies.

Facing Iran’s expansive influence, the Sunni Arab states have coalesced in unprecedented ways, often with Israel’s quiet cooperation, to form a counterbalancing bloc. The Gulf Arab monarchies – led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – view Iran’s regional meddling and potential nuclearization as an existential threat. This shared threat perception has driven former rivals into alignment. Notably, the past few years saw Arab-Israeli normalization accelerate under the Abraham Accords of 2020, with the UAE, Bahrain, and others establishing open ties with Israel. Saudi Arabia, while not formally normalized with Israel as of 2025, has developed a tacit security understanding grounded in intelligence sharing and coordination against Iran. The Arab states and Israel now routinely find common cause: for instance, joint air defense initiatives and intelligence cooperation aim to counter Iranian missiles and drone attacks that have plagued the region (such as the 2019 Iranian-claimed strike on Saudi oil facilities). As one analysis observes, “The United States, Israel, and many Arab states now have a common goal to free the Middle East of Iran’s influence — a rare consensus.”[7] This rare convergence has effectively created a de facto coalition spanning Israel and key Arab powers, with the United States as the security guarantor. It represents a major reordering of the regional architecture, transcending the old Arab–Israeli divide in favor of a new Arab–Israeli vs. Iranian Cleavage.

The Gulf dynamics further underscore this bloc-versus-block tension. Since the 1980s, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been locked in a rivalry often dubbed a “Cold War” in the Middle East. They have backed opposite sides in conflicts from Lebanon to Bahrain and Syria to Yemen, largely along sectarian Sunni–Shia lines. By 2025, this rivalry persists, but its contours have shifted. In a surprising diplomatic turn, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations in March 2023 (in a deal brokered by China). This détente has somewhat cooled direct Saudi-Iran confrontation – Riyadh, for instance, engaged in talks to wind down the Yemen war. However, Saudi skepticism of Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions remains high. The Saudi leadership has signaled that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Riyadh might seek its own (or at least a nuclear guarantee from a great power). Thus, while Saudi-Iran tensions eased on the surface with the 2023 rapprochement, a deeper strategic distrust endures. Other Gulf states mirror this duality: the UAE maintains diplomatic and commercial ties with Iran even as it also deepens security cooperation with Israel (the UAE operates Israeli-supplied air defenses and intelligence systems to guard against Iranian missiles). In essence, Arab states pursue hedging strategies – engaging Iran just enough to avoid provocation, but simultaneously arming themselves and partnering with Israel/America to contain Iranian power.

Beyond the Gulf, the Levant and Mesopotamia are key battlegrounds of the Iran–Arab contest. In Iraq, Iran wields outsized influence through Shi’a militias and political allies, much to the alarm of Iraq’s Sunni neighbors. Countries like Jordan and the Gulf states fear Iraq could become an Iranian client state, extending Tehran’s reach to their borders. Conversely, Iraq’s Arab leaders have tried re-integrating into the Arab fold (e.g. Iraqi participation in Arab League initiatives) to balance Iran’s sway. In Syria, Iran’s intervention to save Bashar al-Assad has made it the dominant foreign actor on the ground, alongside Russia. This has deeply concerned Arab states; initially they supported the Syrian rebels, but by 2023-24 we saw Arab governments pivot to re-engage with Damascus (e.g. Syria’s readmission to the Arab League in 2023) to peel it away from Tehran’s orbit. As one Gulf official noted, bringing Assad “back in the Arab tent” is partly aimed at diluting Iran’s influence in Syria[11]. Meanwhile in Lebanon, Iran’s proxy Hezbollah effectively over matches any Arab or Western influence, entrenching Iranian influence on Israel’s northern border. This imbalance has driven Arab states (like the Gulf countries) to largely disengage from Lebanon or impose conditions (e.g. linking aid to curbing Hezbollah) – so far unsuccessfully.

An important element of this architecture is the Arab-Israeli normalization and military interoperability that has emerged. Israel, once isolated in the region, now conducts open exercises or security dialogues with Gulf partners. In 2022, for example, Israel participated in a U.S.-led naval exercise alongside Saudi and Emirati forces, implicitly oriented against Iranian naval threats. Shared early-warning data on Iranian missiles is another avenue of cooperation. The net effect is an increasingly integrated air defense and security network connecting Israel and Arab states. This poses a growing strategic challenge to Iran: it faces not disunited Arab rivals, but an increasingly coordinated front buttressed by Israel’s advanced military technology and the U.S. military footprint in Arab states (such as American bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE). The recent Arab–Israeli consensus on countering Iran was unthinkable a decade ago, but Iran’s own actions have catalyzed it. Tehran’s missile strikes, drone attacks on Saudi oil exports, and support for the Houthis’ missile assaults on Gulf shipping have convinced many Arab leaders that Israel is a lesser evil – even a necessary partner – compared to an unchecked Iran.

Despite this hostile environment, Iran has tried to counterbalance the Arab-Israeli bloc by reducing threat perceptions among neutral or fence-sitting neighbors. Tehran launched a “Neighborhood Policy” in the past few years, seeking rapprochement and confidence-building with Gulf states and others. This included high-level visits and trade talks with the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and even outreach to Egypt and Jordan behind the scenes. As an analyst noted, “Tehran endeavors to reduce threat perceptions among its Arab neighbors by implementing a neighborhood policy and expanding bilateral diplomatic relations.”[1] The 2023 Saudi-Iran deal was the centerpiece of this effort. Iran also joined multilateral forums like the Baghdad Conference (with Iraq, Jordan, France, etc.) to present a less menacing image. The goal is to prevent a unified Sunni front against Iran and to exploit any divergences between Arab priorities and those of Israel or Washington. This hedging has met mixed success – while some Gulf states welcome de-escalation, none have abandoned their security ties to the U.S. or Israel. Nonetheless, Iran’s diplomatic engagement has at least opened channels that could limit accidental escalations.

In summary, the regional security order is polarized between Iran’s sphere of influence and an opposing Arab-Israeli coalition. The Gulf Arabs and Israel are drawn together by a shared interest in containing Iran’s reach, forming a new geopolitical alignment unimaginable prior to the Abraham Accords. Iran’s extensive proxy network gives it a forward presence in Arab heartlands, but also validates its neighbors’ worst fears, spurring them to strengthen alliances. This tug-of-war is on vivid display from Yemen to Lebanon – a map of conflict zones and influence that resembles a cold war rivalry. The Middle East’s stability in the coming years will hinge on this balance: whether Iran’s revolutionary expansionism can be curtailed by an Arab-Israeli entente, or whether Tehran can find accommodation with its neighbors to avert a deeper, possibly armed, confrontation.

3. Israel’s Strategic Doctrine and the Covert War

Israel views Iran’s nuclear ambition as an existential threat and has pursued a multi-pronged strategy – both declaratory and covert – to prevent Tehran from ever acquiring the bomb. Central to Israel’s approach is the Begin Doctrine, a long-standing strategic tenet that Israel will not tolerate any hostile regional state obtaining nuclear weapons. Named after Prime Minister Menachem Begin (who ordered the 1981 airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor), this doctrine has guided Israeli action against nuclear programs in Iraq, Syria, and now Iran. In practice, it means Israel is prepared to use force unilaterally to destroy nuclear capabilities before they become operational. In June 1981, Israel’s air force famously destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor, and in 2007 it carried out a secret strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor – both instances enforcing a “zero nukes for enemies” red line. As Iran’s program advanced, Israeli leaders repeatedly stressed that “all options are on the table,” signaling readiness to attack Iran’s nuclear sites if diplomacy fails. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, at the UN in 2012, literally drew a red line on a cartoon bomb graphic to illustrate the point at which Israel might strike (around 90% enrichment). This doctrine of preemption remains integral to Israel’s grand strategy: Israel will act militarily if necessary to stop Iran from crossing into nuclear weapons status[4].

Yet direct military action on the scale of Osirak is enormously challenging against Iran, given the dispersed and fortified nature of its nuclear facilities. Accordingly, Israel has waged a covert war of sabotage, cyber disruption, and assassination to set back Iran’s program without sparking full-blown conventional war. Over the past 15+ years, a shadow campaign – often attributed to Israel’s Mossad – has targeted Iran’s nuclear scientists, supply chains, and enrichment infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2012, at least four Iranian nuclear scientists (Majid Shahriari, Darioush Rezaeinejad, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, among others) were assassinated, typically via magnetic bombs on their cars or drive-by shootings, in operations widely believed to be the work of Israeli agents[14]. The covert campaign paused for some years during the JCPOA period, but resumed with dramatic impact in late 2020 when Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was killed in a sophisticated ambush east of Tehran. Observers noted Fakhrizadeh’s importance was such that this assassination dealt Iran’s program a setback comparable to the loss of IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. Israeli officials, while never formally claiming these acts, quietly signaled satisfaction; such covert eliminations are intended to deprive Iran of key expertise and sow fear among those involved in weaponization work.

In addition to human targets, Israel has sabotaged Iran’s nuclear facilities and materials. The most famous instance was the joint U.S.-Israeli deployment of the Stuxnet cyber worm around 2009-2010, which disrupted and physically destroyed about 1,000 Iranian centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant. This cyber-sabotage operation, never officially acknowledged by Israel, demonstrated a novel capability to derail Iran’s program discreetly. Subsequently, mysterious explosions and power outages have occurred at Iranian nuclear sites. In July 2020, a blast ripped through a centrifuge assembly workshop at Natanz, causing extensive damage; Iranian officials blamed Israeli sabotage. Another attack struck Natanz’s electricity grid in April 2021, temporarily knocking out enrichment operations – again attributed to Mossad operatives possibly using an explosive device planted on-site. These covert operations have introduced persistent delays and uncertainty into Iran’s progress, forcing Tehran to invest in additional protection and redundancy. The cumulative effect is that Israel has bought time for the international community by tactically slowing Iran’s nuclear momentum, even as diplomacy stalls.

Enforcing nuclear red lines has also led Israel into the realm of espionage and intelligence heists. In a daring 2018 operation, Mossad agents infiltrated a Tehran warehouse and stole a half-ton of secret nuclear archives – thousands of files detailing Iran’s past weaponization efforts. The trove, later partially disclosed by Netanyahu, not only embarrassingly exposed Iranian deceit (showing continued nuclear weapon design work pre-2003) but also armed Israel with intimate knowledge of Iran’s clandestine sites and plans. This intelligence edge has likely guided subsequent Israeli covert actions. Israeli spies on the ground in Iran (reportedly working with local dissidents) have been implicated in operations ranging from planting explosives in nuclear facilities to tracking down components en route to Iran. Each time Iran moves sensitive materials, it must worry that Israeli intelligence is a step ahead. This constant pressure forces Iran to be more cautious and slows its timeline.

Concurrently, Israel conducts an international campaign to shape diplomatic red lines and marshal pressure. Its officials regularly share intelligence with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prompt inspections of suspect Iranian sites. Israel also presses world powers to adopt a hard line in negotiations – for instance, calling for zero enrichment in Iran or automatic snap-back sanctions if Iran breaches certain levels. Although Israel was not a party to the JCPOA, its influence was felt; in 2022, Israeli diplomacy helped sway the U.S. to hold firm on not removing the IRGC from terror blacklists, a key Iranian demand that contributed to talks stalling. Israeli leaders emphasize that “no deal is better than a bad deal,” implicitly warning they reserve freedom of action if they judge diplomacy inadequate. This stance is backed by preparation: the Israel Defense Forces have visibly intensified training for a long-range strike on Iran, including acquiring refueling tankers and specialized munitions (bunker-buster bombs). By making these preparations public, Israel bolsters the credibility of its military threat – a last-resort measure if covert tactics and global diplomacy both fall short.

Importantly, Israel’s strategic doctrine operates under the shadow of its own undeclared nuclear arsenal. Israel is widely understood to possess a substantial nuclear stockpile (estimates range around 80-200 warheads) as a deterrent of last resort[1]. Though undeclared, this arsenal underpins Israel’s confidence in confronting nuclear aspirants: Israeli officials assume that even if Iran someday got one or a few bombs, Israel’s second-strike capability (e.g. nuclear-armed submarines) would deter Iran from ever using them. However, Israel’s goal is to avoid reaching that perilous stage altogether. Thus, the Begin Doctrine and covert campaign aim to “stop Iran before it gets the bomb,”rather than rely on mutual deterrence. Israeli strategists often invoke the historical precedent of the Holocaust, arguing that the Jewish state cannot depend on containment or deterrence alone against a regime that openly calls for Israel’s elimination. This existential mindset justifies bold and sometimes extralegal actions on foreign soil, as seen in the assassination program. While such tactics carry risks – Iran has retaliated at times with its own covert plots against Israelis abroad – Israel judges that the risks of inaction are far greater.

The covert war has imposed real costs on Iran, but it has not decisively halted Iran’s nuclear progress. Iranian responses have included hardening and burying facilities (e.g. moving more centrifuge halls to the underground Fordow site), improving counter-intelligence to catch spies, and accelerating certain activities (like quickly reinstalling damaged machines). Iran’s shift to higher enrichment levels after 2020 can be seen partly as defiance against Israeli sabotage and U.S. pressure – effectively reducing breakout time despite the covert attacks. This cat-and-mouse dynamic may continue indefinitely, unless resolved by a diplomatic breakthrough or a military confrontation. In the meantime, Israel’s combination of the Begin Doctrine (a declaratory policy of preventive force) and an ongoing shadow war serves as both a brake on Iran’s nuclear drive and a statement of Israel’s resolve. It broadcasts a clear message: Israel will enforce its nuclear red lines by any means necessary, from the halls of Vienna to the alleyways of Tehran. As one commentator summarized, Israel’s “not-so-secret war” has become the practical expression of its doctrine, aiming to keep Iran perpetually one step away from the nuclear threshold[1].

4. The Russia–China Balancing Act

Iran’s strategic orientation by 2025 is increasingly influenced by the great-power triangle of Russia, China, and the United States. In the face of Western pressure, Tehran has leaned into partnerships with Moscow and Beijing – leveraging arms deals, economic ties, and diplomatic cover – yet it must also navigate the limits of this support. Both Russia and China perform a balancing act: they seek to benefit from ties with Iran and counter U.S. influence, but neither wants Iran to actually provoke a nuclear crisis or war that could destabilize the region. Thus, Iran’s relations with these Eurasian powers are characterized by opportunistic alignment rather than full alliances.

Military and security cooperation with Russia has deepened markedly, especially since 2022. The Ukraine war proved a turning point: as Russia faced Western sanctions and military strain, Iran emerged as a critical partner by supplying Moscow with armed drones (Shahed-136 loitering munitions) and other materiel. In return, Russia has expedited certain arms sales to Iran. Notably, Tehran and Moscow signed a strategic cooperation treaty in January 2025, encompassing military and economic coordination[3]. One high-profile deal reportedly under discussion is the delivery of advanced Su-35 fighter jets from Russia to Iran, which would significantly upgrade Iran’s aging air force. Russia has also provided Iran with air defense systems in the past (the S-300 PMU2 was delivered in 2016) and continues to consider requests for the newer S-400, though wary of upsetting Gulf clients. On the nuclear front, Russia’s state firm Rosatom has long assisted Iran’s civilian program, constructing the Bushehr nuclear power plant and contracting to build additional reactor units. In diplomatic arenas, Moscow shields Tehran by watering down or vetoing resolutions against Iran in the UN Security Council and IAEA. For example, Russia and China have often opposed or softened IAEA Board of Governors censures of Iran’s safeguards violations. Russia’s calculus is clear: it opposes a nuclear-armed Iran on its border, but it also opposes U.S.-led efforts to isolate Iran. As a Russian analyst put it, “Moscow has no interest in the expansion of the nuclear club”, yet it “does not want to see its military cooperation with Tehran tested by a collision between Washington and Tehran”[3]. In other words, Russia prefers an outcome where Iran stays just below the weapons threshold – enough to distract and deter the West, but not enough to trigger war that could entangle Russia.

China’s role is equally pivotal, albeit more economic in nature. China is Iran’s top trading partner and oil customer, a relationship that has only grown as Beijing eagerly buys Iranian oil at a discount (ignoring U.S. secondary sanctions). In 2021, Iran and China signed a sweeping 25-year cooperation agreement, symbolically aligning Iran with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Though actual Chinese investments under this deal have lagged expectations, politically it signaled Iran’s “Look East” pivot. Iran also gained full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2022 and was invited to join BRICS (effective 2024), moves that Tehran touts as breaking its isolation[11]. Diplomatically, Beijing provides Iran a protective umbrella in global forums. For instance, China has consistently called for resolving the nuclear issue through dialogue and opposed “illegal” unilateral sanctions on Iran mfa.gov.cn. In March 2025, China even hosted a meeting in Beijing with Iran and Russia specifically to coordinate positions on the Iranian nuclear issue[6]. This came alongside China’s remarkable mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement in 2023 – a sign of Beijing’s rising profile in Middle East peacemaking. Strategically, China sees Iran as an important node in BRI (the “Silk Road” rail and pipeline routes linking China to the Persian Gulf) and as a counterweight to U.S. influence. However, China too has limits: it does not want Iran to provoke a regional war that could threaten energy supplies (China imports significant oil from the Gulf) or force Beijing into a binary choice between Iran and the Arab states. Chinese envoys privately urge Tehran to show restraint and stay in the JCPOA framework; public Chinese statements emphasize support for a “diplomatic solution” and Iran’s “legitimate rights” under the NPT[6]. In essence, China seeks a stable status quo where Iran is not defeated or isolated (keeping U.S. power in check), but also not unleashed to destabilize the Gulf.

Iran has skillfully tried to hedge and extract benefits from both great powers. For example, Tehran has discussed trading its excess enriched uranium stockpile to Russia in exchange for sanctions relief or fuel, a revival of an old idea that Moscow is amenable to – as long as the U.S. quietly concurs. Similarly, Iran offered lucrative infrastructure and energy projects to Chinese companies, such as a potential partnership to develop the giant South Pars gas field. Tehran’s negotiating strategy in nuclear talks often factors in the degree of backing from Moscow and Beijing. In late 2023 and early 2024, reports suggested Iran slowed its 60% enrichment for a time, possibly due to secret understandings with the U.S. (via intermediaries)[1]; such restraint likely had Chinese/Russian encouragement, as both wanted to forestall a crisis. Yet when diplomacy stalls, Iran turns more fully eastward: President Ebrahim Raisi has openly said deepening ties with Russia and China is a pillar of Iran’s “Economy of Resistance” to sanctions.

Crucially, Russia and China themselves maintain relations with Iran’s rivals, pursuing their own balancing. Russia has cultivated ties with Israel (Putin met Netanyahu frequently and coordinated in Syria’s airspace until relations soured somewhat over Ukraine). Even in the ongoing Oman nuclear talks of 2025, Moscow signaled it might play a key mediating role in a future nuclear agreement, possibly positioning itself as a guarantor or venue for Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile[16]. This suggests Russia wants to be seen as part of the solution, not just Iran’s patron – thereby preserving ties with other regional players like the Saudis and Israelis. China likewise has enormous stakes with Arab Gulf states (Saudi Arabia and the UAE are major oil suppliers and investment partners). Beijing has balanced by hosting summits with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders and selling drones and missiles to countries like Saudi Arabia, even as it quietly sells some dual-use technology to Iran. China’s ultimate interest is a peaceful Gulf for unimpeded commerce, so it sometimes nudges Iran toward compromise (for instance, in early 2022 Chinese diplomats reportedly urged Iran to moderate its demands in Vienna talks). However, when U.S.-China tensions spike, Beijing is happy to use Iran as a card – strengthening energy ties and conducting naval drills with Iran and Russia, as a show of a “multipolar” front.

One notable new development is the arms sales calculus post-2020. The UN conventional arms embargo on Iran expired in October 2020 (per UNSCR 2231). This opened the door for Iran to formally purchase advanced weapons. Russia’s war needs delayed some transfers, but by 2025 Iran is expectant: beyond fighter jets, it eyes tanks, helicopters, and coastal defense systems from Russia. China could theoretically sell modern combat drones or anti-ship missiles (though no major sale is confirmed, likely due to not wanting to trigger U.S. sanctions on Chinese entities). There is also talk of technology sharing – Iran reportedly seeking Russian help to beef up its air defenses and perhaps know-how for satellite launch vehicles (which overlap with ICBM tech). In return, Iran has become a logistics hub for sanctioned Russian oil and goods, helping Moscow evade sanctions via swaps and re-export through Iranian ports. This burgeoning Iran-Russia sanctions-busting trade (est. over $1.5 billion in 2024 oil swaps[1]) further intertwines their economies against Western pressure.

Despite this convergent interest, Russia and China draw a red line at an Iranian bomb. Both voted for past UN sanctions on Iran (in 2010) when Iran’s enrichment escalated, and they likely would again if Tehran tested a weapon. As a Russian analyst noted, “Moscow has no interest in nurturing a nuclear-armed competitor in the Caspian region.”[3] Beijing similarly would loathe a nuclear arms race on its energy lifeline. Thus, their support acts as a double-edged sword for Iran: it buffers Iran against U.S. pressure but comes with the expectation that Iran exercises nuclear restraint. In March 2025, when indirect U.S.-Iran talks resumed, China and Russia coordinated to encourage an interim deal – hosting meetings and signaling Trump’s administration that a compromise is preferable to conflict[16]. This highlights the balancing act: Moscow and Beijing seek to prevent both Iranian collapse (which could bring a pro-West regime) and Iranian overreach (which could spark war). They hedge their bets regionally – improving ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others – so that Iran is one asset among many, not a singular ally.

From Iran’s perspective, the Russia-China axis is an invaluable strategic hedge. It provides diplomatic oxygen and markets while the West isolates Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister often says the future lies in “multilateralism” and not relying on the West. In practice, however, Iran knows Russia and China won’t fight its battles: no Russian or Chinese soldier will come to Iran’s aid if Israel strikes Natanz, nor will they compensate Iran fully for sanctions losses. This reality has driven Iran’s leadership to pursue strategic autonomy – building its own indigenous military industries (missiles, drones) and a self-reliant nuclear fuel cycle. Russia and China have helped on the margins (Russia with reactor fuel supply, China with some centrifuge components years ago), but Iran’s program is largely home-grown now. In a sense, Tehran has used Moscow and Beijing as political shields while forging ahead independently.

In conclusion, the Russia–China balancing act in Iran’s nuclear standoff is a critical factor that tempers both extremes. It restrains Washington (knowing Iran has powerful friends) and restrains Tehran (knowing it shouldn’t alienate those friends by going nuclear). Iran has adeptly inserted itself into the new Eurasian “Axis” emerging against U.S. hegemony, joining forums like BRICS and SCO to signal alignment[11]. But its integration is limited by the very thing that drove it there: its nuclear ambitions and regional policies. Russia and China support Iran’s regime security and economic survival, yet neither wants a nuclear-armed Iran or a Middle East conflagration. Thus, they will continue walking a fine line – propping up Tehran just enough – and Iran will continue playing the “Eastern card” while being careful not to overstep in a way that loses Moscow and Beijing’s favor. This great-power minuet will significantly influence whether Iran’s nuclear crisis moves toward resolution or escalation in the coming years.

5. U.S. Strategic Evolution: From Engagement to Pressure

The United States’ approach to Iran’s nuclear program has swung dramatically over the past three administrations – from Barack Obama’s diplomatic engagement and the landmark 2015 nuclear accord, to Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign and exit from the deal, to Joe Biden’s oscillation between tentative re-engagement and renewed pressure. U.S. strategy from 2009 to 2025 can be understood as an evolution through distinct phases, responding to both Iran’s actions and U.S. domestic politics. Below is a timeline of key U.S. policy shifts and events regarding Iran’s nuclear program:

Throughout these phases, a few constants underpinned U.S. strategy. First, preventing a nuclear-armed Iran remained a bipartisan U.S. priority, even as tactics differed. Obama bet on multilateral diplomacy and technical constraints to delay Iran’s bomb capacity by >10 years. Trump, rejecting that approach, aimed to coerce Iran into a broader surrender – not just on nuclear issues but also its regional aggression – via crippling sanctions[4]. Biden attempted to restore the status quo ante but found the clock had run forward: Iran’s nuclear advances and domestic U.S. politics made a simple return to the JCPOA impossible[13]. Second, U.S. policy has been tightly intertwined with Israeli concerns and Gulf security. Under Obama, unprecedented military aid was given to Israel and the Gulf states to reassure them alongside the JCPOA. Under Trump, U.S. and Israeli policies were virtually in lockstep; Israeli intelligence even helped drive the maximum pressure campaign by exposing Iran’s secret archives and undeclared sites, bolstering Trump’s rationale. Meanwhile, the Abraham Accords themselves were facilitated by a mutual U.S.-Israeli-Arab desire to solidify an anti-Iran front. By 2025, the U.S. finds itself coordinating with Israel and Arab partners on deterrence measures – such as integrating regional missile defenses – even as it pursues diplomacy. This reflects a synthesis of engagement and pressure: deterrence to buy time for diplomacy, diplomacy to reduce the need for military action.

Finally, domestic U.S. politics have influenced this evolution. Obama expended significant political capital to overcome Congressional opposition to the JCPOA in 2015. Trump harnessed domestic skepticism (among Republicans and some Democrats) to justify quitting the deal in 2018, a move popular with his base and certain allies. Biden, facing a more polarized climate and focused on other crises (Russia, China), showed hesitancy to invest in a new Iran deal fight at home, especially after Iran’s repression of protesters made it morally and politically tougher to negotiate. Now Trump’s return – assuming a harder line but apparently seeking a quick “win” deal – introduces new uncertainties. The timeline above underscores that U.S. strategy toward Iran is not linear but reactive and often volatile, swinging between carrots and sticks. Whether this yields a durable solution or a cycle of escalation will depend on choices made in Washington and Tehran in the critical months ahead.

6. Internal Power Structure: The Role of the IRGC

Any analysis of Iran’s nuclear program must reckon with the outsize role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the nation’s power structure. The IRGC is far more than a military force – it is a parallel state apparatus that exerts profound influence over Iran’s national security policy, economy, and even nuclear governance. When it comes to the nuclear program and the military-industrial complex, the IRGC serves as both guardian and driver: guarding the program’s security and secrecy, and driving the development of missiles and other strategic capabilities that complement a potential nuclear deterrent.

At the apex of Iran’s system sits the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), who has the final say on all nuclear decisions[2]. The IRGC answers directly to him, bypassing the elected government[10]. In practice, this means the IRGC’s top commanders participate in or heavily influence the closed-door deliberations on nuclear strategy. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) – Iran’s high-policy body on defense and foreign affairs – includes the IRGC’s Commander-in-Chief as a statutory member alongside the President and other officials. Under Khamenei’s leadership, the SNSC formulates nuclear negotiating positions and security policy; IRGC input in this forum ensures the Guard’s preferences (usually hardline and security-centric) are reflected. Notably, during the 2013-2015 talks leading to the JCPOA, the SNSC empowered Foreign Minister Zarif as chief negotiator, but IRGC leaders were skeptical of the deal. By 2019, after the U.S. withdrawal, Khamenei shifted the nuclear file out of the Foreign Ministry’s sole control, giving more weight to SNSC members (like then-IRGC commander Shamkhani) – a signal of IRGC hawks taking a firmer grip on nuclear policy.

Structurally, the IRGC’s sway can be visualized in Iran’s power diagram. The Supreme Leader sits at the top, overseeing multiple power centers. The IRGC reports directly to him, parallel to the regular army and above the civilian executive on security matters[10]. The President (currently Raisi) and civilian ministries like the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) manage day-to-day nuclear operations and diplomacy, but they operate within red lines set by Khamenei and the security establishment. If the President is perceived as too conciliatory (as was Rouhani), the IRGC and hardliners apply pressure through media, parliament, or even arrests (as they did to members of Zarif’s team in 2020). Essentially, the IRGC acts as the Supreme Leader’s iron fist and eyes/ears, ensuring the nuclear program serves the regime’s ideological and security goals, not just technocratic objectives.

The IRGC’s role in nuclear governance manifests in several concrete ways:

• Security and secrecy: The IRGC is entrusted with protecting Iran’s nuclear facilities and preventing espionage or sabotage. In March 2022, Iran even established a dedicated IRGC unit for nuclear security – the “Command for the Protection and Security of Nuclear Centers”[16]. This new branch underscores that the regime views the nuclear program as a strategic asset warranting military-level protection. IRGC personnel guard sites like Natanz, Fordow, Arak, and various research centers. After a string of security breaches (assassinations, facility explosions), the IRGC purged and upgraded its security teams. Commanders like General Ahmad Haghtalab (who threatened revising nuclear doctrine if Israel attacks[2]) head these protective forces. The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, a powerful internal security arm, also hunts for foreign spies and monitors Iranian scientists for any treason. Such tight IRGC control creates a climate of secrecy and compartmentalization around the program.
• Procurement and illicit networks: During years of sanctions, the IRGC developed vast smuggling and procurement networks to acquire technology for both its nuclear and missile programs. The IRGC’s economic wing and myriad front companies helped obtain high-strength metals, vacuum pumps, electronics, and other dual-use items despite export controls. Many of the entities sanctioned internationally (e.g., by the U.S. Treasury) for nuclear or missile procurement are IRGC-linked businesses or persons. The IRGC’s clandestine Quds Force has even been implicated in sourcing from the black market. This demonstrates how the IRGC’s shadow economic empire (which spans construction, energy, and import-export) has been harnessed to sustain Iran’s military-industrial advancement under sanction[10]. The Guards leverage their control of key ports and border crossings (like Bandar Abbas port or airports) to covertly bring in needed materials away from prying eyes.
• Military-industrial buildup: The IRGC effectively runs Iran’s ballistic missile program, which is a core component of its military-industrial complex. The IRGC Aerospace Force develops and fields ballistic missiles such as the Shahab, Sejjil, and Khorramshahr series – all potential nuclear delivery vehicles. Since missiles are integral to any future nuclear deterrent, the IRGC’s stewardship here is crucial. Under international pressure, Iran has refused to negotiate its missiles, largely at the IRGC’s behest. Over decades, the IRGC built an indigenous missile industry with ranges covering the entire Middle East (up to ~2000 km). It also ventures into satellite launch vehicles (like the Simorgh rocket) which double as ICBM prototypes. Furthermore, the IRGC oversees advanced weapons projects (e.g. the development of drones, cruise missiles, solid-fuel engines) that enhance Iran’s strategic punch. One could say the IRGC has created a parallel military R&D ecosystem: while the civilian AEOI focuses on nuclear material production, the IRGC focuses on the means to weaponize and deliver such material if ever decided. In any scenario where Iran moved to build a bomb, the IRGC and Ministry of Defense (often led by IRGC veterans) would likely take charge of weaponization – mating a warhead to a missile. Indeed, Iran’s secret pre-2003 weaponization program (the “AMAD Plan” exposed in the nuclear archives) was under the Ministry of Defense’s auspices, closely tied to the IRGC, and led by IRGC Brigadier Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. This indicates the historical role of the IRGC in weapon design and testing; should Iran resume such work, it would almost certainly be an IRGC-managed effort, with civilian authorities kept at arms length for plausible deniability.
• Domestic industrial influence: The IRGC has also entrenched itself in Iran’s broader economy, including sectors linked to nuclear and defense infrastructure. Through conglomerates like Khatam al-Anbiya (the IRGC’s engineering arm), it has built nuclear facilities (tunneling for Fordow, heavy water plant construction, etc.) and missile silos. Khatam al-Anbiya, now Iran’s largest contractor, took over many projects after foreign companies withdrew post-2018. The Guards thus control budgets and patronage for the nuclear industry’s supply chain and construction. Their stake in the program’s success is literal – it boosts their institutional prestige and pocketbooks. Sanctions evasion has made some IRGC commanders fabulously wealthy, as they take cuts from illicit oil sales or smuggling, which they justify as funding strategic projects. The line between enriching the nation’s nuclear capability and enriching the IRGC itself blurs; critics inside Iran have dubbed the Guards “an industrial empire with political clout” thriving on sanctions[16].
• Nuclear decision-making and brinksmanship: The IRGC’s influence is evident in Iran’s more confrontational nuclear steps in recent years. For example, after the 2020 assassination of Fakhrizadeh, the IRGC-backed hardline parliament passed a law pushing the government to raise enrichment to 20% and cease voluntary IAEA transparency – measures which were implemented in 2021 and beyond. IRGC leaders publicly endorsed these escalatory moves as leverage against the West. IRGC Commander Hossein Salami and others frequently give fiery speeches about not fearing conflict and vowing to “resist until America yields.” Such rhetoric shapes Khamenei’s own posture. By 2022-2023, IRGC figures openly debated nuclear weaponization – a taboo previously. Parliamentarian Ahmad Naderi (IRGC-aligned) suggested Iran “conduct a nuclear test and officially announce it” for deterrence, while another proposed enriching to 90%. Though these are extreme views, their airing shows the IRGC-led camp’s mindset: leaning into brinkmanship rather than concession. Conversely, more pragmatic voices (like former Speaker Ali Larijani) who hinted at compromise were sidelined until Khamenei revived them for tactical use in 2025 talks. The ebb and flow of such voices depends largely on IRGC acceptance. Khamenei often balances factions, but the IRGC is his power base and enforcer; when they close ranks on an issue, their stance tends to prevail.

In terms of governance structure, Iran’s system can be seen as a hybrid theocracy-militarocracy. The Supreme Leader – a cleric – sits atop, but his power is buttressed by the IRGC’s muscle. The President and cabinet manage daily governance but must defer to the Supreme Leader and often accommodate IRGC interests (Raisi’s cabinet, for instance, includes multiple IRGC veterans, and he has given IRGC firms big contracts). The judiciary, also led by a former IRGC member (Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei), and the parliament (with many IRGC-aligned members) further entrench the Guard’s influence. Thus, the IRGC is entwined at all levels: formulating policy, executing programs, and policing outcomes. This dominance has grown over time; many observers note that “the IRGC has surpassed even the clerical class in political power” in Iran[16].

For the nuclear file, this means any resolution or significant decision (like agreeing to a new deal or, conversely, dashing for a bomb) will reflect IRGC consent. When Iran agreed to the JCPOA in 2015, Khamenei likely overrode IRGC reservations for the sake of sanctions relief, but he compensated by allowing the Guard to expand its economic role post-deal. When Trump quit the deal, the IRGC line of “we told you so” was validated, leading to a more confrontational stance. Now in 2025, as talks resume, the IRGC will be ensuring no concessions undermine Iran’s “national strength” – code for missiles and regional influence, which Khamenei has said are non-negotiable[11]. The IRGC likely sets red lines for negotiators: e.g., insistence on keeping advanced centrifuge knowledge, demand for immediate sanctions lifting, etc. If a deal happens that the IRGC perceives as too limiting, they could undercut it (as they tested ballistic missiles in 2016 right after JCPOA implementation, pushing boundaries). On the other hand, if diplomacy fails, it is the IRGC that will steer Iran’s next moves – possibly even the fateful decision to cross the nuclear threshold, if Khamenei gives the nod. In that scenario, the IRGC would spearhead assembling a warhead, conducting a test, and preparing the arsenal, all likely in secret until a bomb is achieved.

In conclusion, the IRGC’s role in Iran’s nuclear and military-industrial domain is paramount and pervasive. It secures the program against foreign and internal threats, supplies it through illicit means, and integrates it with Iran’s missile capabilities. The IRGC’s hardline influence tends to favor nuclear advancement and resistance over compromise, though it ultimately defers to the Supreme Leader’s directives. Any governance diagram of Iran shows the IRGC’s tentacles across all power centers – truly the power behind (and beneath) the throne in matters of state security. This reality complicates diplomatic efforts, as Western negotiators indirectly contend with IRGC skepticism and sabotage. Yet it also provides a degree of stability: the IRGC, driven by regime survival, is risk-averse about actions that could jeopardize the Islamic Republic. While it pushes bold moves, it also carefully calculates responses (e.g., retaliating proportionately to avoid full war). The IRGC’s command of the nuclear file thus injects a militaristic discipline – one anchored in both ambition and caution – that will shape Iran’s strategic decisions in the years to come.

7. Strategic Scenarios: 2025–2030 Outlook

Looking toward the second half of the 2020s, Iran’s nuclear trajectory could follow several distinct strategic scenarios. Given the complex interplay of diplomacy, regional tensions, and Iran’s internal politics, it is useful to sketch a scenario matrix evaluating four plausible outcomes: (A) Revival of the JCPOA or a new nuclear agreement, (B) Iran stabilizing as a long-term threshold nuclear state, (C) Military confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program, and (D) Internal collapse of the Iranian regime. Each scenario carries its own likelihood, risks, and strategic impact.

A. JCPOA Revival or New Agreement – “Cold Consensus”

Description: Iran and the U.S./P5+1 manage to negotiate either a revival of the 2015 JCPOA or a fresh agreement that limits Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. This could be an “JCPOA 2.0” with updated timelines, or an interim deal that freezes the most dangerous enrichment activities. In 2025, we see glimmers of this scenario: the Oman-mediated talks with the new Trump administration have floated an interim deal concept (e.g., Iran halting 60% enrichment and allowing intrusive inspections, in return for unfreezing oil revenues and pausing new sanctions)[5]. In a successful scenario, this interim step would be formalized and perhaps expanded upon by 2026 into a comprehensive accord.

Likelihood: Moderate. Several factors favor an agreement: Iran’s economy is in dire need of sanctions relief, and the leadership may judge that a deal is preferable to edging closer to war or collapse. The U.S., under Trump or any president, has an interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons without new Middle East wars. The precedent of the JCPOA provides a blueprint. Notably, Iran has signaled interest in a phased approach (interim then full deal)[5], acknowledging that a maximalist solution in one go is unrealistic. European and Asian powers strongly back a return to diplomacy. However, significant obstacles temper the likelihood: mutual distrust is extreme (after Trump’s pullout, Iran demands guarantees the U.S. finds hard to give), and regional players like Israel and Saudi Arabia will press for tougher terms on Iran than Iran will accept. Domestic politics in both Tehran and Washington are fraught – hardliners in Iran call negotiating with Trump humiliating, while U.S. Congress (especially if controlled by hawks) could oppose any sanctions relief. On balance, a limited accord (short-term freeze) is more likely than a grand bargain covering missiles and regional issues. The scenario’s probability might be around 50% for an interim deal in 2025-2026, but lower (~25%) for a full JCPOA revival that lasts into 2030.

Risks and Impact: If achieved, a new agreement would dial down near-term proliferation risk. It could restore IAEA monitoring and push Iran’s breakout time back to several months (though likely not the full 12 months of the original JCPOA[13], given Iran’s irreversible knowledge gains). This reduces the chance of an Israeli preemptive strike, lowering regional war risk in the short run. Economically, sanctions relief could significantly boost Iran’s oil exports and economy, empowering the regime. However, an agreement might only delay and not eliminate the threat. The shorter sunsets and Iran’s advanced centrifuges mean that by late 2020s, many JCPOA restrictions would expire, potentially leading us back to a crisis as Iran ramps up capacity (this was a chief criticism of the original deal). Another risk is moral hazard: Gulf states and Israel might feel abandoned or endangered by a U.S.-Iran détente and take matters into their own hands (e.g., Saudi pursuing nuclear technology, Israel covertly sabotaging Iran even during the deal). But overall, scenario A would likely bring a period of stability and economic opening. Iran might refocus on development; the regime would have resources to placate its population (potentially reducing internal pressures). Yet political reform is unlikely – if anything, the regime might become more confident internally. The big question: does a deal truly alter Iran’s strategic calculus or just pause it? If it’s merely a cold consensus to kick the can, then by 2030 we may face Iran nearer a bomb with an even richer regime. Nonetheless, most stakeholders would consider scenario A preferable to the alternatives, at least to avoid war in the 2020s.

B. Stable Threshold Status – “Forever on the Brink”

Description: In this scenario, no formal new deal is reached, but Iran also refrains from testing or openly weaponizing a nuclear device. Instead, Iran settles into a long-term threshold state posture – maintaining enrichment at high levels (60% or even 90% in small quantities), accumulating know-how and perhaps enough fissile material for several weapons, but stopping short of assembling an actual bomb. This “Japan model” was essentially Iran’s strategy after 2019 and could continue indefinitely if managed carefully. Tehran would likely keep IAEA inspectors at least partially in-country to avoid complete severance (perhaps under a temporary inspections arrangement), and might calibrate its stockpiles just below triggering an international crisis. The regime would continue to deny seeking nuclear arms, sticking to the Supreme Leader’s fatwa narrative, while in effect positioning itself such that it could build a bomb in weeks if threatened. The world, in turn, grudgingly contains and deters Iran as a latent nuclear power without formal resolution.

Likelihood: This scenario is quite plausible – perhaps the default outcome if diplomacy fails but military conflict is also avoided. The likelihood could be around 50% that Iran drifts into late-decade with no deal yet no bomb test. Iran’s leadership may actually prefer threshold ambiguity: it provides maximum deterrent value (enemies must assume Iran could have nukes in short order[9]) while minimizing the repercussions that an outright weapons program would bring. Historically, some powerful nations (Japan, South Korea, even pre-1967 Israel) found this posture useful. For Iran, threshold status could be sustainable if managed – it requires restraint (not weaponizing) and patience to endure ongoing sanctions. Whether Iran’s economy can bear more years of sanctions is a factor; but if oil sales via China and smuggling suffice to prevent collapse, Iran might tough it out. The U.S. and EU might tacitly accept a threshold Iran as long as there is no bomb or major expansion – essentially a policy of deterrence and containment. Israel’s tolerance is the biggest question: can Israel live with an Iran that is perpetually weeks from the bomb? Possibly yes, if Israel and the U.S. are confident in intelligence to detect breakout and in their ability to strike if needed. Indeed, some analysts argue that deterring a nuclear-capable Iran is feasible because Iran’s aims are defensive[8]. But the uncertainty and hair-trigger nature of threshold status means it’s inherently unstable long-term.

Risks and Impact: A stable threshold scenario would keep the region in a state of chronic tension. On one hand, it avoids the worst outcomes (no actual proliferation, no war). Iran would continue to suffer economically under sanctions, but it would also continue developing its missile and proxy capabilities, feeling partially shielded by its latent nuclear option. One risk is miscalculation: if Iran is threshold and some crisis occurs (say a border clash with Israel or a U.S. raid on an IRGC base in Syria), Iran might behave more aggressively thinking its near-nuclear status deters full retaliation, which could provoke an unforeseen escalation spiral. Another risk is erosion of non-proliferation norms: Saudi Arabia and possibly Turkey or Egypt could decide to pursue their own threshold capabilities in response. Saudi officials have openly stated they would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran gets one; even short of that, Riyadh could invest in uranium enrichment or nuclear technology (possibly with Chinese or Pakistani help) to keep pace. This could lead to a multi-country threshold race by 2030, greatly undermining the NPT. There’s also the matter of IAEA monitoring: Iran’s current reduced transparency means over time, we lose confidence in what Iran has produced[13]. By 2030, Iran could hypothetically have stockpiled enough 60% uranium for, say, 10-12 weapons and hidden some of it. The longer threshold status lasts without a formal agreement, the higher the chance of undetected “sneakout” to a bomb[13]. Nonetheless, scenario B could be manageable through rigorous containment: continued sanctions to slow Iran’s progress, active intelligence operations (sabotage, cyber) to trim its capabilities, and strong deterrent postures from the U.S. and Israel to dissuade Iran from going further. It’s a cold peace, with Iran somewhat boxed in but still unlidded. The humanitarian cost to ordinary Iranians would be high due to the enduring sanctions strangulation and lack of economic growth. Politically, the regime would likely double-down on repression to control discontent, pointing to the “external threat” to justify hardships. So while this scenario averts war, it perpetuates a climate of hostility and domestic stagnation in Iran. It is perhaps the most likely scenario if neither side can achieve their maximal goals.

C. Military Confrontation – “Strike and Storm”

Description: In this scenario, diplomacy fails and Iran continues to advance its program past red lines, triggering a military confrontation. This could range from a limited Israeli strike on nuclear facilities to a broader conflict drawing in the U.S. and regional actors. One pathway: by 2026 Iran amasses enough 90% highly enriched uranium for several bombs or kicks out IAEA inspectors, leading Israel (with or without U.S. support) to launch preemptive strikes (air and cyber) on key sites like Natanz, Fordow, Arak, etc. Alternatively, a major crisis (e.g. Iran is caught testing a nuclear device in secret or an Iranian proxy war with Israel spirals) prompts the U.S. President to green-light military action. The confrontation could start with strikes on nuclear infrastructure but would likely expand as Iran retaliates against U.S. bases, Gulf oil infrastructure, and shipping. Essentially, this scenario sees the breakdown of containment and the Begin Doctrine being implemented with force, leading to war in the Gulf region.

Likelihood: While all sides try to avoid this outcome, its probability is not negligible – perhaps 20-30% over the next five years, higher if no diplomatic progress is made. The tripwires for war are clearly visible: if Iran were caught dashing to a bomb (or actually building one), Israel almost certainly would strike, calculating that an imperfect attack is better than allowing a hostile nuclear power to emerge. Israeli leadership has prepared its public and forces for this possibility[4]. The U.S. might join or support from the sidelines (providing refueling, munitions, etc.) because a nuclear Iran is also deemed unacceptable in Washington. Conversely, Iran might miscalculate and do something like expel IAEA inspectors or heavily fortify its program in a way that convinces others it’s going for weapons, thereby inviting strikes. There’s also the wildcard of misjudgment during military drills or proxy clashes – e.g., IRGC navy forces harassing U.S. ships could escalate and spark direct conflict. Overall, if diplomacy stays deadlocked and Iran inches closer to weapons capability each year, the chance of military confrontation increases. Domestic politics could also influence this: an Israeli government under extreme pressure or a U.S. administration facing criticism of inaction might resort to force to “solve” the Iran issue. History shows states often choose to strike earlier rather than later when facing proliferation (e.g., Osirak 1981, Syria 2007). As Iran’s program gets more redundant and hardened by 2030, some might think 2025-2026 is the last window to act.

Risks and Impact: The outbreak of conflict with Iran would be severe for regional and global security. Even a “surgical” strike would not be clean – Iran has many sites, some deep underground; a serious attempt to degrade the program might require dozens of strikes over days or weeks. Iran almost certainly would retaliate fiercely: it could launch salvos of ballistic missiles at Israeli cities and military bases, attack U.S. bases in Qatar, UAE, Bahrain (over 50,000 U.S. troops are in Iran’s neighborhood)[16], and activate proxies. Hezbollah could open a northern front against Israel with its huge rocket arsenal, leading to a devastating Israel-Lebanon war. The Houthis might fire missiles at Saudi and Emirati targets. Iranian forces could attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz – a chokepoint for ~20% of global oil – causing an energy crisis and global economic shock. The U.S. would then intervene heavily to keep shipping lanes open and protect allies. We could be looking at a regional war in which Iran is vastly outmatched militarily by the U.S.-Israel-Gulf coalition, but capable of sowing chaos and destruction in the interim. Iran’s nuclear program would be set back by strikes, but unless the strikes are extremely thorough (and involve ground operations to secure sites, which is unlikely due to high risk), Iran could rebuild within a few years – likely with even stronger political will to actually acquire nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent. In fact, an oft-cited risk is that an attack might only delay Iran 2-3 years while all but guaranteeing Iran’s determination to get the bomb thereafter, perhaps even withdrawing from the NPT immediately. Another risk is unintended escalation: once war starts, it’s unpredictable. A missile could hit an American ship causing mass casualties, prompting the U.S. to target Iran’s leadership or conventional forces broadly. That could edge toward regime-threatening conflict, and in desperation Iran’s commanders might consider any last-resort options (although currently Iran has no nukes, it could engage in massive terrorism abroad, etc.). In the fog of war, misidentifications or overreactions could occur – e.g. Iran mistakenly striking a neutral country’s vessel (similar to how it downed a Ukrainian airliner in 2020 amid tensions). Casualties across the region could be in the tens of thousands or more if a full campaign erupted. Global markets would reel from oil price spikes and instability. Politically, within Iran, war could either rally nationalism around the flag, prolonging the regime’s life, or if defeats are stark, possibly crack the regime’s credibility (e.g., IRGC embarrassment could embolden domestic foes). It’s worth noting that some believe only extreme pressure like military strikes or the threat of regime survival will compel Iran to choose between “the bomb or survival” and back down amwaj.media. However, that gamble has extraordinarily high stakes. In summary, scenario C is highly dangerous and unpredictable, with outcomes ranging from only partial short-term success (if Iran’s program is crippled) to a multi-year regional conflagration that leaves Iran more determined to go nuclear. It is the scenario most policymakers want to avoid, yet by 2030, if all else fails, it cannot be ruled out.

D. Internal Regime Collapse – “Persian Spring”

Description: This scenario contemplates a fundamental change in Iran’s political system due to internal upheaval – essentially, the fall of the Islamic Republic as we know it. This could occur via a popular revolution (as nearly happened in 1979, and as attempted in 2009 and 2022 protests) or a fracturing of the elite (for instance, if Supreme Leader Khamenei dies and succession triggers infighting, or if parts of the military turn against the regime). A collapse might not be neat – it could involve a period of chaos or civil conflict. But assume for the scenario that the current theocratic regime is replaced by a markedly different government (perhaps a transitional democratic or military junta) by, say, the late 2020s. How would this affect the nuclear program? Possibly, a new government might redefine national priorities: for example, a more democratic Iran seeking reintegration with the world might agree to stricter limits or even dismantlement of sensitive nuclear capabilities in exchange for full normalization and aid. Alternatively, if collapse comes with violence, there’s a risk of “loose nukes” or loss of control over nuclear materials if regime custodians break down.

Likelihood: Regime collapse in Iran remains the least predictable scenario, but not impossible. Some analysts put low odds (perhaps 10-15% within this decade) barring a major trigger. However, the late 2022 protests over women’s rights showed a widespread alienation from the regime, and economic misery plus generational change is eroding legitimacy. The regime’s security apparatus (IRGC, Basij) is still cohesive and brutally effective at repression – they quelled those protests with force. The Supreme Leader, though elderly (in his mid-80s), has shown no sign of loosening grip, and he recently appointed a hardliner (Ali Akbar Ahmadian) as SNSC secretary and mooted his son or President Raisi as possible successors, indicating an attempt to secure continuity. That said, succession upon Khamenei’s death (whenever it happens) is a wild card. It could be orderly, or it could open splits – especially if popular unrest resurges at that moment. A combination of factors – severe economic crisis, elite defections, perhaps a foreign policy disaster (like a lost war) – might coalesce to topple the regime. Notably, U.S. “maximum pressure” aimed partly to stoke public anger to force change, but it didn’t immediately succeed[4]. Some opposition in exile (e.g. the fringe MEK, monarchists, etc.) agitate, but so far the internal security is loyal. So the likelihood remains low-medium; it might increase towards 2030 as demographic pressures mount and if a charismatic opposition or leaderless revolution gains critical mass.

Risks and Impact: A collapse could fundamentally reset the nuclear issue – potentially for the better, but with major risks along the way. Positive outcome: A post-Islamic Republic government might pursue a path like post-apartheid South Africa or post-Soviet Ukraine/Kazakhstan: deciding that nuclear ambitions cost more than they’re worth, and opting to trade them for international rehabilitation. Indeed, many Iranian dissidents argue the nuclear program has been a costly adventurism that hurt ordinary Iranians for the elite’s ideological goals. A secular, nationally-focused government might prioritize economic revival over uranium enrichment. In that best case, Iran could swiftly come into compliance with the NPT fully, accept extensive verification, and remove the specter of a bomb. Sanctions would lift, regional relations could improve (Arabs might embrace a non-revolutionary Iran), and an arms race would be avoided. However, collapse scenarios are rarely so neat. During the turmoil of regime change, command-and-control of nuclear materials and sites could be jeopardized. There are several tons of low-enriched uranium in Iran and a significant cadre of nuclear experts. A worst-case would be if some faction or rogue commanders decided to “use or lose” assets – conceivably trying to assemble a crude nuclear device as a deterrent against foreign intervention during chaos. This is unlikely unless things get extremely dire, as weaponization is not trivial. More plausible is risk of theft or proliferation: disgruntled scientists could sell knowledge or materials to the highest bidder if central authority falters. The IRGC might hide away some nuclear material as insurance. Alternatively, if the collapse leads to internal conflict, different military units might fight over strategic sites. The international community (U.S., IAEA) would be deeply concerned to secure Iran’s nuclear facilities in such a scenario – possibly even mounting operations to prevent loss of control. Another aspect is who comes next: If somehow a hardline military coup rather than liberal revolution took over (e.g., an IRGC general promising order), they might double-down on nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, especially if they distrust foreign intentions. So collapse doesn’t automatically equal a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue; it depends on the nature of new leadership. Regionally, Iran’s collapse could spark proxy conflicts (various ethnic regions like Kurdish or Baluch areas might seek autonomy, neighbors could meddle). That disorder could last years, during which Iran’s nuclear assets must be safeguarded.

In terms of impact on the nuclear timeline: Initially, program work would likely stall amidst chaos – no progress on enrichment if scientists are fleeing or facilities shut down due to strife. But once a new order emerges, the direction could sharply diverge. The best-case impact: a fundamentally de-nuclearized Iran by 2030, with all enrichment above say 5% eliminated, full transparency, normalized economic ties – a huge boon to nonproliferation and regional stability. The worst-case impact: nuclear weapons actually appearing in the fog of regime change, or loose materials spreading to terror groups, which would be a global security nightmare. Most likely, if collapse occurred, the surviving state would seek international legitimacy and thus be inclined to more moderation on the nuclear front, provided security concerns can be met through other means (perhaps an international security guarantee or regional pact).

In summary, scenario D is highly volatile. It carries the hope that Iran’s strategic orientation could change with a new government, potentially resolving the nuclear crisis in a way the current regime never would. But it is also fraught with short-term dangers that could far exceed the controlled tensions of the status quo. For planning, it’s the scenario with the widest range of outcomes – from the most peaceful to the most chaotic. Policymakers often hesitate to explicitly aim for this outcome because of those uncertainties, though some quietly believe only regime change will truly remove the nuclear threat. As one analysis noted, if the Islamic Republic collapsed, it’s one of the few scenarios where Iran unequivocally would not get the bomb. But banking on this is risky given its unpredictability and potential fallout.

Scenario Matrix (2025–2030):

• JCPOA Revival/New Deal: Likelihood medium; yields temporary reduction of threat, economic relief, but sunsets loom and mistrust persists. Key risk: deal collapses later, back to square one.
• Stable Threshold: Likelihood high if no deal; Iran stays just short of nuclear weapon, contained by deterrence. Manages risk of war but is inherently unstable long-term and could spur regional proliferation.
• Military Confrontation: Likelihood depends on red lines; disastrous consequences regionally, might delay program but at great cost. Key risk: uncontrollable escalation and eventual Iranian reconstitution with even stronger resolve.
• Regime Collapse: Low probability but game-changing; could eliminate nuclear threat if a benign regime emerges, or could dangerously destabilize control of nuclear materials. Key risk: interim chaos leading to proliferation or conflict.

Each scenario demands different policy preparations: strengthening monitoring and alliance assurances for threshold containment; military readiness and economic mitigation plans for a war; diplomatic and economic engagement strategies for a deal; and contingency plans to secure nuclear sites for a collapse. The 2025–2030 period is poised to be decisive – the choices made in the next few years could set Iran on one of these trajectories, for better or worse.

8. Iran vs. North Korea: Strategic Comparative Study

Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear trajectories are often mentioned in the same breath, but the two regimes exhibit important differences in command structure, deterrence strategy, and their international isolation. Comparing Tehran and Pyongyang’s approaches yields insight into how each uses (or intends to use) nuclear capability for regime security, and how global responses to each have diverged.

Political command structure and decision-making: North Korea is a hereditary totalitarian dictatorship centered on the Kim family. Kim Jong-un holds absolute power as Supreme Leader, and the nuclear button is effectively his alone to press. Decision-making in Pyongyang is highly centralized; the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and Worker’s Party are thoroughly loyal instruments of Kim’s personal rule. There is no equivalent of Iran’s factional politics – no independent military faction or competing power centers. By contrast, Iran’s power structure is more complex. Ultimate authority lies with the Supreme Leader (currently Ayatollah Khamenei), but beneath him are multiple centers: the elected government, the IRGC, clerical bodies, etc. Iran’s nuclear policy is debated (albeit behind closed doors) among an elite consensus. The IRGC wields strong influence, yet it doesn’t act unilaterally outside Khamenei’s consent. This means Iranian decisions may reflect a somewhat broader set of inputs (hardliner vs moderate factions, economic considerations, etc.) compared to North Korea’s one-man rule. For example, Iran entered and abided by the JCPOA for several years – a decision Khamenei made after internal deliberation and buy-in from the IRGC and government technocrats. North Korea’s Kim, by contrast, would likely never agree to roll back his nuclear arsenal in the way Iran froze its program; such a decision in Pyongyang is tied to the whims and survival calculus of a single leader, without institutional checks.

One upshot: North Korea’s command structure may allow quicker, riskier decisions (nuclear tests, confrontational moves) because Kim need not consult or fear internal opposition. In Iran, decisions like building a bomb or striking a U.S. base would be consensus-driven and possibly more cautious – Khamenei must consider IRGC and other elite views, and historically has shown a penchant for careful, incremental moves. The Iranian system’s diffuse power centers also mean possible debates on doctrine (e.g., some Iranian officials openly discuss the nuclear option’s merits or lack thereof; such public debate is unthinkable in North Korea). However, Iran’s system can still act decisively when Khamenei aligns the actors (as with speeding nuclear expansion post-2019).

Deterrence strategies: North Korea has gone all-in on a nuclear maximalist deterrence strategy. It has openly tested nuclear bombs (six tests from 2006 to 2017) and developed missiles that can range the U.S. homeland. Pyongyang’s stated doctrine evolved to include the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes if the regime is threatened, and potentially the use of smaller tactical nukes on the battlefield against superior conventional forces. Kim Jong-un likely views his nukes as the guarantor of regime survival (no one can attack him without risking nuclear retaliation on Seoul, Tokyo, or even U.S. cities) and as a tool of coercive diplomacy (to extract concessions). He famously traded barbs and summitry with President Trump, using the threat of continued ICBM tests to bring the U.S. to negotiate – an example of brinkmanship as a strategy. By deploying nuclear weapons, North Korea also seeks to deter internal threats: the military and elite are less likely to consider a coup if Kim commands a nuclear arsenal. In short, North Korea practices deterrence by punishment, explicitly wielding the fear of nuclear devastation to keep adversaries at bay.

Iran’s deterrence approach, as discussed, has been more nuanced and multi-layered. Iran has so far stopped short of weaponization, aiming for a threshold or recessed deterrent: enough nuclear capability to imply a threat without overtly brandishing a bomb. Instead of nuclear weapons, Iran relies on a combination of conventional and unconventional means: a large missile force, regional proxy militias, and asymmetric naval tactics. This gives Iran a form of deterrence by denial and retaliation – e.g., the ability to mine the Strait of Hormuz to deny oil shipping, or to bombard Israel via Hezbollah if attacked. Iran’s leadership has implied that actually possessing nukes might bring more costs (proliferation backlash, perhaps even an arms race with Saudi or a potential U.S./Israeli attack) than benefits, at least under current conditions[1]. Thus, Tehran’s strategy could be described as “nuclear latency”combined with aggressive non-nuclear deterrence. If Iran ever crosses to making bombs, it might adopt a posture closer to Pakistan or India – an assured retaliation strategy with a small arsenal kept for worst-case defense. Analysts predict Iran, if nuclear-armed, would likely keep warheads disassembled or hidden (a recessed deterrent), and not deploy on hair-trigger alerts[12]. The regime would centralize control (to the Supreme Leader/IRGC top brass) and probably declare a policy of no-first-use or at least emphasize defensive use, in order to mitigate international pressure. This would contrast with North Korea’s overt flaunting of nukes for leverage. Indeed, Iran often publicly disavows seeking nukes for moral reasons, a stark difference from North Korea which proudly enshrined itself as a “nuclear state” in its constitution.

Isolation dynamics and external relations: Both regimes are internationally isolated, but the nature and degree of their isolation differ. North Korea is arguably the most isolated country on Earth – a true pariah with minimal trade (mostly with China), no formal alliances (China is a partner but distances itself from NK provocations), and under harsh UN sanctions. Pyongyang’s isolation is near-total: its economy is autarkic and decrepit, and its society is cut off from global information. This very isolation may have enabled Kim to pursue nukes single-mindedly; he has little to lose economically by defying the world, and internal dissent is stifled by decades of brainwashing and repression. The upside for Kim is that external pressure has limited direct effect on altering his course – sanctions hurt but the regime prioritizes nukes over feeding its people if necessary. The downside is North Korea’s diplomatic levers are few: except for nuclear threats, it has little to trade or engage with; thus it sees nuclear weapons as critical to force others to deal with it on equal footing.

Iran’s isolation is significant but not absolute. Iran has a sizable economy (or potential for one) and was integrated in global oil markets. It has diplomatic and trading partners – notably, it maintains normal relations with about half the world, including major countries like China, Russia, India (to some extent), and many neighbors. Even under U.S. sanctions, Iran manages to export oil (often covertly) and import necessities. Culturally and informationally, Iran is far less isolated than North Korea: Iranians travel abroad (pre-COVID, millions did for pilgrimage or tourism), satellite TV and internet (despite censorship) give Iranians more exposure to the world. There is also a large Iranian diaspora. All this means the Iranian regime faces more public awareness of its isolation – domestic discontent rises when sanctions cripple the economy, as seen in protests with slogans against costly foreign adventures and nuclear provocations. This awareness creates some pressure on Tehran to balance its nuclear ambitions with economic relief – hence why Iran agreed to the JCPOA when sanctions bit hard. North Korea’s public, by contrast, has been indoctrinated to endure “suffering for the bomb” as a patriotic duty, with little means to pressure the leadership.

Additionally, Iran’s multifaceted identity (Persian, Shi’a, revolutionary) allows it to have alliances and proxy relationships (with groups in Iraq, Lebanon, etc.), something North Korea lacks. Pyongyang’s regime doesn’t have non-state allies or ideological brethren abroad; its only partners are transactional (like Chinese support to prevent collapse, or Syrian cooperation historically on missiles). Iran’s network gives it a form of strategic depth and a way to retaliate unconventionally if attacked (e.g., Iran can stir trouble via proxies – NK cannot). However, this also invites coalition-building against Iran (Arab-Israeli alignment, as discussed).

In terms of lessons from North Korea’s experience: Iran has surely observed that once North Korea obtained nuclear weapons, the international community grudgingly had to adapt to that reality – the cost of foreign military action against Pyongyang became prohibitive. Some Iranian hardliners argue Iran should follow North Korea’s model to ensure the regime’s survival and bargaining power. On the other hand, North Korea also suffered decades of extreme sanctions and remained a poor, isolated state – Iran’s leadership, especially pragmatists, don’t want to turn Iran into an impoverished hermit kingdom just for nuclear weapons. Iran’s population is roughly 85 million (versus NK’s ~25 million) with a much higher expectation for standard of living and international engagement; a North Korea-style isolation would be far more destabilizing internally for Iran. Thus, Iran has tried to have it both ways: advancing nuclear capability while intermittently negotiating to keep some sanctions at bay.

A specific comparative point is NPT compliance: North Korea quit the NPT in 2003 to pursue nukes openly. Iran has thus far remained in the NPT and vehemently claims its right to peaceful nuclear technology – using the treaty to justify enrichment while denying weapon intent. Staying in the NPT (albeit not fully compliant with safeguards at times) indicates Iran values some international legitimacy and the option to quickly restore normal relations via a deal. North Korea’s departure from the NPT was basically a declaration of opting for nukes over integration. Iran’s strategy might be to stay within the rules until it chooses otherwise; if one day Iran leaves the NPT, that will signal a pivot to the North Korea route, potentially.

Military posture and proliferation behavior: North Korea has by now likely miniaturized nuclear warheads that can mount on missiles, and it fields possibly dozens of nuclear weapons. It even developed tactical nuclear warheads recently. It conducts regular missile tests, some simulating nuclear strikes, to solidify deterrence credibility. Iran, conversely, has not tested a nuclear device (which is a huge threshold politically and technically). If it ever decided to weaponize, it might do so covertly to avoid international backlash – possibly trying to emulate Israel’s opacity (though that’s hard in today’s world and given the scrutiny on Iran). The two regimes also differ in nuclear posture transparency: North Korea publishes propaganda about its nuclear forces, parades missiles, and issues explicit nuclear threats. Iran, if nuclear-armed, might more likely keep any weapons hidden and undeclared, leveraging ambiguity as it does now. Iranian strategic culture historically values “taqiyah” (strategic dissimulation) and long-term gradualism, whereas North Korea favors shock and awe to compel respect (in part because it has little else to leverage).

Finally, consider external security guarantees: North Korea essentially relies only on its own nuclear forces for regime security. (China’s protection is uncertain – China is averse to regime collapse but not committed to defend NK in a war it starts.) Iran still benefits from the fact that many countries (even U.S. allies) are reluctant to see war in the Gulf; Iran’s geography and global economic importance (oil) provide a sort of passive security – the bar for invasion is high. Iran also occasionally receives Russian or Chinese diplomatic shielding. So Iran might perceive less acute need to rush to nukes if it can maintain a balance via conventional and geopolitical means. North Korea’s geopolitical situation is more desperate, with the U.S. and South Korea literally on its border and no such economic buffer effect.

In summary, Iran and North Korea share the fundamental motive of deterring U.S.-led regime change via nuclear capabilities, but they differ in execution. North Korea has actually built and brandished nuclear weapons as the linchpin of its survival strategy, tolerating extreme isolation to do so. Iran, more embedded in the international system and with multiple tools at its disposal (missiles, proxies, diplomacy), has pursued a more calculated, restrained path – at least to date – stopping at the threshold. North Korea’s strategy is a stark “nukes at all costs” gamble that paid off in securing Kim’s rule but at the price of permanent pariah status. Iran seems to seek a more balanced outcome: deterrence without complete pariahdom – though whether that is achievable remains an open question. How these differences play out will determine if Iran eventually becomes a Middle Eastern North Korea or if it carves a different path entirely.

9. Nuclear Capability in Iran’s Grand Strategy

For the Islamic Republic of Iran, nuclear capability is not an isolated goal but a piece of a larger grand strategy aimed at ensuring regime survival, regional influence, and strategic autonomy in a hostile environment. In Tehran’s grand strategy, a latent or actual nuclear arsenal functions as a tool to rebalance power in the Persian Gulf and enable Iran to pursue a multi-aligned foreign policy free from domination by any one bloc.

Regime survival tool: At its core, Iran’s interest in nuclear capability stems from the regime’s paramount objective of self-preservation. Surrounded by U.S. military presence and rivals, Tehran’s leadership views a nuclear deterrent (even an implicit one) as the ultimate insurance against foreign attempts at regime change or invasion[9]. Iranian strategists often point to examples: Saddam Hussein, who lacked nuclear weapons and was overthrown by the U.S., versus North Korea’s Kim, whose nuclear arms have deterred similar fate. As a Cato analysis noted, “The main military task that would be achieved by an Iranian nuclear deterrent would be taking the threat of preventive U.S. attack off the table.”[8] Indeed, a credible nuclear deterrent would fundamentally alter Washington’s calculus; any plan for conventional strikes or regime-change operations would carry unacceptably high risks if Iran could retaliate with a nuclear strike on U.S. bases or allies. Even the process of reaching threshold status has arguably enhanced Iran’s security: the U.S., Israel, and the GCC have to think twice about striking Iran now compared to 20 years ago, knowing Iran might be on the cusp of a weapon. Senator Lindsey Graham summarized Tehran’s logic: “when you have a nuclear weapon, nobody attacks you.”[9] This reasoning is deeply ingrained in Iran’s grand strategy since the brutal Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s taught the regime to never again be caught weak and alone. Hence, nuclear capability – or the perception thereof – is essentially Tehran’s shield of last resort, deterring existential threats and giving the regime breathing space to manage internal and external pressures.

Rebalancing Gulf power: A nuclear-capable Iran significantly shifts the power balance in the Gulf and Middle East. The Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, currently enjoy U.S. security backing and superior conventional arsenals (purchased at great expense). Iran’s military, while large, lags in airpower and modern conventional hardware due to decades of sanctions (Saudi’s defense spending dwarfs Iran’s by roughly 5:1[18]). Iranian doctrine therefore emphasizes asymmetric tactics and indigenous missile forces to counter this imbalance[18]. Nuclear capability would serve as the great equalizer. It would neutralize the massive spending of the Gulf Arab states to some extent; for instance, Saudi Arabia’s advanced jets and U.S.-supplied missiles could be deterred if Iran holds the threat of nuclear retaliation against Saudi oil infrastructure or cities. Essentially, a nuclear Iran would ascend to a peer competitor status in the region – not in conventional strength, but in strategic deterrence, forcing neighbors to treat it with a new level of deference. This is precisely why those neighbors so vehemently oppose Iran’s nuclear ambitions. From Iran’s perspective, though, nuclear capability corrects what it sees as an unjust imbalance where monarchical “client” states host foreign troops next door (Bahrain’s U.S. 5th Fleet base, Qatar’s Al Udeid base, etc.) and outspend Iran militarily. With a bomb, Iran could assert that foreign powers can no longer dictate regional affairs without consequence. Tehran could more confidently push U.S. forces out of the Gulf – a long-standing goal – by raising the risks of their presence.

Moreover, Iran attaining nuclear weapons might spark a crisis of confidence among the Gulf states in U.S. security guarantees. If Riyadh and Abu Dhabi doubt whether the U.S. would really trade New York for Riyadh (so to speak) in a nuclear showdown, they may accommodate Iran more or seek their own deterrents. Iran likely calculates that even the prospect of this forces the Gulf Arabs to hedge. Indeed, we have seen some hedging: the UAE engaged diplomatically with Iran to ease tensions since 2019, and Saudi Arabia pursued the 2023 Beijing-brokered détente. Iran’s neighborhood policy of recent years – improving ties with Kuwait, Oman, etc. – can be seen as Tehran trying to assure its neighbors enough to prevent a united front against it even as it grows stronger militarily. If Iran does go nuclear, it will likely amplify a charm offensive to avoid provoking an immediate Arab proliferation response. The aim would be to Finlandize the Gulf states – not conquer or openly threaten them, but subtly compel them to acknowledge Iran’s primacy and avoid aligning too closely with Iran’s enemies. In effect, nuclear capability would be Iran’s ace cardin establishing a new regional order where Western hegemony recedes and regional issues are settled more on Iranian terms.

Multi-alignment and great power relations: Nuclear capability also feeds into Iran’s strategy of multi-alignment, i.e., avoiding overdependence on any single global power and instead leveraging relationships with multiple powers (China, Russia, even Europe when possible) to its advantage. Freed from the existential need for a U.S. security guarantee (which the Gulf monarchies rely on), Iran prides itself on strategic independence. A nuclear deterrent would anchor that independence. For instance, it could allow Iran to engage with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia’s Eurasian projects from a position of strength rather than desperation. Iran has already joined Eurasian blocs like the SCO and BRICS to signal an “eastern orientation”[11], aligning with rising powers as a counterweight to U.S. pressure. A nuclear Iran would be a more valuable partner for Russia and China – it would command respect as a fellow defier of Western dominance and could coordinate on global positions (we see some of this already, with Moscow and Beijing often siding with Tehran at the UN). Conversely, Iran would not be beholden to any patron; just as North Korea sometimes defies even China’s advice, Iran could pursue its revolutionary interests without fear of abandonment. This fits Tehran’s revolutionary ethos of “Neither East nor West.” In practice, Iran’s multi-alignment means it seeks to play powers off against each other: e.g., using the threat of pivoting fully to China to pressure Europe for concessions, or hinting at Russo-Iranian military pacts to spook the U.S. In 2025, such dynamics are in play – Iran’s strategic cooperation with Russia has deepened (drones for Russia, potential arms deals[2]), and China shielded Iran diplomatically while facilitating Saudi-Iran rapprochement. With a nuclear deterrent underpinning its regime security, Iran could double-down on a “Look East” economic policy(as sanctions persist, turning more to Chinese and regional markets) while still flirting with improved ties to Europe if it suits. Essentially, nuclear arms would give Iran a stronger hand in international bargaining – a sense that it can say no to demands, as North Korea does, because the regime cannot be pushed too far.

Regional ambitions and ideological goals: Iran’s grand strategy is not only defensive; it also has an ideological component of leading a “Resistance Axis” against U.S./Israeli influence and championing Shi’a and Islamist causes in the region. Nuclear capability would bolster Iran’s claim as the preeminent power of the Muslim world’s east – a counterweight to Israel’s (undeclared) nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. The late Gen. Qassem Soleimani once reportedly said that an Iranian bomb would make the Muslim world’s heart “tremble with pride” (though officially Iran denies seeking it). While this is hyperbole, there is an element of Iran wanting the prestige and leverage that come with nuclear status. It could embolden Iran’s support to proxies: for example, under a nuclear umbrella, Iran might feel even more secure in arming Hezbollah or militias, calculating that adversaries would hesitate to retaliate robustly for fear of escalation. This dynamic is already observed with Pakistan vis-à-vis India – Pakistan’s nukes have allowed it to engage in asymmetric warfare under a shield. Iran could attempt a similar “aggression under the nuclear umbrella.” That said, Iran would likely be cautious not to invite a direct nuclear confrontation; more likely it would use the increased deterrence to solidify gains in places like Syria and Iraq, knowing its adversaries have limited escalation options.

Economic and diplomatic multi-alignment: Sanctions relief is a major driver when Iran tempers its nuclear work (as with the JCPOA); conversely, when Iran advances nuclear capability, it often expects to strengthen its bargaining and eventually get relief on better terms. In the grand strategy, nuclear capability is a bargaining chip as well as a shield[1]. Tehran has engaged in “nuclear diplomacy” where it ramps up the program to gain leverage (like producing 60% uranium) then offers to trade limits for sanctions easing. This tit-for-tat is a recurring motif. Ultimately, Iran seeks the removal of sanctions strangling its economy – not to become a closed-off fortress like North Korea. The ideal outcome for Iran would be to reach the threshold of nuclear weapons, compel the West to accept that reality (as it has with India or Pakistan), lift sanctions, and integrate Iran as a regional power. Essentially, to eat its cake and have it: keep a nuclear deterrent capability and enjoy economic normalization. Whether that is achievable is questionable; many Western leaders fear that outcome’s proliferation implications. Yet Iran’s calibrated approach suggests they aim for a situation akin to Pakistan after 1998 – initially sanctioned for testing nukes, but gradually accepted and sanctions lifted (Pakistan today faces no broad sanctions despite having ~160 warheads). Iran probably sees itself similarly: a pivotal state too important to isolate forever, eventually the world will have to do business with a nuclear Iran, especially given its oil/gas reserves and geostrategic location. Already, despite sanctions, Iran has been exporting more oil in 2023-2024 (around 1.5 million barrels/day) partly because global oil markets need it and U.S. enforcement softened[1]. Multi-alignment here means Iran will engage whoever is willing despite U.S. sanctions – selling oil to China, bartering with Russia, trading non-dollar with neighbors – to erode the sanctions regime.

In conclusion, nuclear capability in Iran’s grand strategy serves as a multi-faceted asset: a survival guarantee, a power equalizer in the Gulf, and a prop for Iran’s independence in global politics. It complements Iran’s other strategies – missile proliferation, proxy warfare, and diplomatic balancing – to create a resilient posture against pressure. While it introduces risks (e.g., triggering a regional arms race or economic backlash), the Iranian leadership appears to judge that a latent nuclear capacity is worth those costs. As a 2024 UK Parliament report noted, Iran explicitly rejected negotiating away matters of “national strength” like missiles and proxies, signaling they see these (including nuclear know-how) as non-negotiable pillars of regime power[11]. A nuclear-capable Iran would firmly entrench its role as a regional kingpin, able to pursue multi-aligned partnerships and defy attempts to isolate it. However, one must note grand strategy can be a double-edged sword: if mismanaged, pushing toward nuclear weapons might also harden an opposing coalition (the Abraham Accord bloc, etc.) and justify perpetual sanctions, undermining Iran’s economy from within. Thus, Iran’s challenge is to wield the nuclear card in a way that maximizes deterrence and bargaining power without provoking destructive consequences. Its grand strategy, at least as articulated by figures like Khamenei, is that Iran can indeed navigate that narrow path – preserving the Islamic Republic through savvy balancing and strategic patience, with nuclear capability as the linchpin ensuring its sovereignty and regional primacy.

10. Theoretical Framing: Offensive Realism and Balance of Threat

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities can be illuminated by international relations theories, particularly Offensive Realism and Balance of Threat theory, alongside insights from strategists like John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Barry Posen. These frameworks help explain Iran’s behavior as a rational response to its security environment and the reactions it provokes in others.

Offensive Realism (Mearsheimer): Offensive realism posits that in an anarchic international system with no central authority, states are inherently concerned with survival and thus seek to maximize their power relative to rivals. John Mearsheimer argues that great powers (and by extension, regional powers) strive for hegemony in their region as the surest way to secure themselves[20]. Applying this to Iran, we see a mid-sized power in a dangerous neighborhood, historically invaded and encircled by U.S. military presence, naturally driven to increase its power – nuclear capability being the apex of power acquisition short of outright war. From an offensive realist perspective, Iran’s nuclear aspirations are a logical strategy to deter potential aggressors and possibly achieve regional dominance. Mearsheimer famously noted that if Ukraine still had nuclear weapons after the Soviet collapse, Russia might not have invaded it; similarly, Iranian strategists likely believe a nuclear arsenal will safeguard Iran against external subjugation. Offensive realism also suggests Iran won’t necessarily stop at minimal deterrence if it can get away with more – it will keep pushing until balanced by others. Indeed, Iran’s incremental violation of nuclear limits since 2019 (enriching to 4.5%, then 20%, now 60%[1]) reflects a creeping advance of power as long as it is not decisively checked. Mearsheimer might predict that Iran, once capable, will indeed build nuclear weapons, because great powers do not rely on trust or norms for security; they accumulate hard power. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, he implied states like Iran in a tough neighborhood have strong incentives to pursue nuclear arsenals if possible. Offensive realism also frames Iran’s regional interventions (Iraq, Syria, etc.) as power-maximizing – creating a sphere of influence – rather than purely ideological. In sum, Mearsheimer’s lens sees Iran as a rational, power-seeking state trying to become a Gulf hegemon, and a nuclear deterrent is an effective means to that end[20]. This helps explain why Iran has been willing to bear enormous economic cost for its nuclear program: survival and increased relative power outweigh short-term wealth in this calculus.

Balance of Threat (Walt): Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory refines classical balance of power by suggesting states align against the most threatening state, not necessarily the most powerful. Threat is measured by aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions. Iran’s nuclear program can be seen as triggering a balance-of-threat response in its region. Walt would note that Iran, by increasing its offensive capability (nuclear potential plus missiles) and often issuing aggressive rhetoric towards Israel and the Gulf monarchies, elevates itself as a salient threat in their eyes. Thus, we observe Israel and Sunni Arab states drawing closer – an alignment of convenience balancing against the Iranian threat[7]. The Abraham Accords and quiet security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf is a textbook case of Walt’s theory: decades of enmity were put aside as these states perceived revolutionary Iran (especially a nuclear-capable Iran) as the greater threat to balance. Walt’s framework also explains why smaller neighbors (like Kuwait, Bahrain) stick with a U.S.-led security umbrella; Iran’s proximity and meddling (e.g., alleged support for Shi’a dissent in Bahrain) make it threatening beyond just its raw capabilities. Meanwhile, Iran has tried to soften the perception of threat among Arabs, engaging in diplomacy to undercut balancing[1]. This aligns with Walt’s idea: if Iran can appear less threatening (e.g., by making nice with Saudi Arabia in 2023), it may prevent or fracture opposing alliances. Indeed, balance-of-threat dynamics were seen when, after the 2003 Iraq War removed Saddam (a counter-weight), other states grew more concerned about Iran filling the vacuum, which arguably spurred more vigorous Iranian containment efforts. Walt might argue that U.S. presence in the region ironically heightened Iran’s threat perception and thus its aggressive posture, which then increased others’ threat perception of Iran – a spiral of insecurity. Iran’s grand strategy can be partially viewed as trying to avoid being the target of an overwhelming balancing coalition by calibrating its actions (hence, sometimes Iran pursues a rapprochement, as with the UAE or Oman, to reduce perceived threat). Yet developing nuclear weapons almost certainly elevates Iran to top-threat status for neighbors, inviting balancing like potential Saudi nuclear acquisition or at least tighter US-Israel-Arab cooperation. Walt would likely advise that if Iran wants security, it should ameliorate neighbors’ threat perceptions – but Iran’s revolutionary ideology and power pursuits often undermine that. On the flip side, balance-of-threat theory also explains Iran’s own alliances: Iran gravitated towards Russia and China because it perceives the U.S.-Israeli-Saudi axis as a dire threat to it, so it balances by aligning with anti-Western great powers. Iran also tries to increase threat to adversaries (missiles, proxies) to deter them – an offensive realist flavor – but also reassure on some fronts (signing non-aggression pacts or showing defensive intent) to avoid uniting everyone against it.

Posen’s Perspective (Selective Accommodation and Deterrence): Barry Posen, a prominent realist strategist, has written about the concept of a “nuclear-armed Iran” being containable and warned against hysteria. Posen would note that nuclear weapons would likely give Iran only a limited increase in security, not offensive dominance, because the logic of deterrence holds: Iran could not use nukes for aggression without inviting destruction[8]. Posen’s analysis might frame Iran’s nuclear quest as mainly defensive – a rational deterrent against U.S./Israeli attack – and he often argues the U.S. can live with a nuclear Iran by relying on deterrence, just as it did with the USSR or China. This aligns with the realist emphasis on states as rational actors: Iran’s leaders, however ideological, have given signals they understand nuclear weapons are to ward off threats, not to launch apocalyptic offensives (Khamenei’s “nukes are haram” rhetoric could be seen as assurance to avoid spooking others too much[2]). Posen suggests that even if Iran got a bomb, it wouldn’t dramatically shift the regional balance of power – it would prevent invasion but wouldn’t let Iran conquer neighbors or blackmail effectively[8]. History supports this: nuclear states rarely successfully coerce non-nuclear states for major gains beyond self-defense. He also highlights that the U.S. and Israel’s overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority would continue to deter Iran from reckless behavior[8]. In theoretical terms, Posen leans towards the prudence of containment and restraint: that the U.S. need not take extreme actions (like preventive war) because rational deterrence can manage a nuclear Iran. This view contends that Iran is a security-seeking state more than a messianic suicidal one, so standard deterrence theory applies. Posen’s emphasis on “offshore balancing” would perhaps argue the U.S. should step back a bit militarily and let local powers counter-balance Iran, intervening only if Iran truly threatened to dominate the Gulf (which he likely thinks is unlikely given balance-of-power dynamics)[8]. Essentially, Posen might see an Iran with a few nukes as analogous to other secondary nuclear powers, manageable through containment policies—contrary to alarmist views that Iran would suddenly hand nukes to terrorists or nuke Tel Aviv at first chance (which Walt and Posen both consider highly implausible given Iran’s demonstrated caution when its survival is on the line).

Balance of Threat and Offensive Realism Combined: Iran’s behavior exhibits a blend: it pursues power like offensive realism predicts, but it is constrained by the balancing reactions it triggers, as balance-of-threat theory describes. Mearsheimer would not be surprised that Iran wants nukes; Walt would not be surprised that others coalesce to stop it. For example, when Iran expanded influence after 2003 (supporting militias in Iraq, etc.), it unintentionally made itself appear more threatening, leading to the US-Arab-Israeli tacit alliance (the “rare consensus” to counter Iran[7]). The theories together explain a cycle: Iran’s quest for security leads it to assert power (nuclear and regional), which leads others to view Iran as a threat and respond, which in turn keeps Iran feeling insecure and doubling down. Breaking this security dilemma would require building mutual threat-reduction – something attempted with the JCPOA, which temporarily reduced threat perception by capping Iran’s program (so the balance-of-threat eased: Gulf states felt less imminent nuclear danger). But as offensive realism suggests, a state like Iran might only consider itself truly safe when it’s unassailable, i.e., nuclear-armed and regionally predominant, an outcome the balance-of-threat dynamic likely prevents because it alarms too many others.

Ideological overlay: While realism frameworks treat states as unitary rational actors, Iran’s revolutionary ideology adds a wrinkle. However, even that ideology can be seen through a realist lens: it’s a tool to expand influence (supporting co-sectarian groups, claiming leadership of the Muslim world) and justify security measures. Walt’s concept of “revolutionary power” suggests revolutionary states initially appear more threatening due to unpredictable ideology, causing intense balancing. Over time, if Iran moderates behavior, neighbors might balance less aggressively. There are signs in 2025 of ideological pragmatism: Iran making up with Saudi Arabia shows willingness to prioritize security over sectarian ideology when needed.

In conclusion, theoretical framing helps demystify Iran’s nuclear strategy: Offensive realism explains why Iran doggedly increases its power and sees nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor. Balance-of-threat explains why regional states react strongly and how Iran’s own actions influence the threat it is perceived to be, thus shaping the coalitions against it. Posen’s strategic logic suggests Iran will likely be cautious with any nuclear capability and that containment (rather than war) is a viable strategy for others. Iran’s nuclear brinkmanship thus appears, through a realist prism, quite rational: it is not aiming to recklessly use a bomb, but to possess one (or the capacity for one) to maximize its security and leverage while trying to avoid crossing thresholds that would bring overwhelming balancing or preemption. The rationality of this brinkmanship is borne out by Iran’s behavior so far – pushing the envelope but not sprinting to weaponize overnight, hedging under the threshold, exactly what a cost-calculating state would do. Over 2025–2030, these theories predict continued cautious chess: Iran will edge toward nuclear arms (offensive realist drive), but probably not overtly test or deploy them unless cornered, as it is aware of the balancing response that could trigger war or regime-ending sanctions (balance-of-threat restraint). Meanwhile, opponents will continue strengthening alliances and deterrents to raise the costs if Iran goes too far, hoping to either deter Iran’s final steps or contain it if it crosses them. Each side is essentially following a realist playbook, making Iran’s nuclear saga a quintessential example of security dilemma dynamics in international relations.

Final Section: Integrated Strategic Outlook

Drawing together the threads of Iran’s nuclear program analysis reveals a strategic reality defined by rational brinkmanship and delicate deterrence. Iran’s leadership – skeptical of external intentions yet keenly aware of costs – has pursued a nuclear capability that stops just short of provoking an all-out response, a strategy that has so far paid dividends in bolstering Tehran’s security and leverage. As we look ahead to 2025–2030, the strategic outlook is one of tenuous balance: Iran will likely maintain its threshold status or even creep slightly beyond, betting that the rationality of other actors will prevent them from triggering a catastrophic escalation, while those other actors bank on Iran’s own rational desire for survival to stop it from using or openly brandishing a nuclear bomb. Managing this brinkmanship will be the central challenge for regional and global security.

Rationality of brinkmanship: Despite fiery rhetoric, Iran’s behavior in the nuclear realm has been marked by caution and calculation. The regime’s actions align with a rational actor model – it seeks maximum deterrence at minimum acceptable risk. Tehran’s decision to enrich to 60% (dramatically shortening breakout time)[1], for instance, was a risky move, yet it was done under the cover of continuing NPT membership and IAEA oversight (albeit reduced), thereby avoiding a complete breach that might invite military strikes. Iran has signaled willingness to pause or reverse some steps in exchange for relief[1], indicating a pragmatic use of nuclear advances as bargaining chips, not as ends in themselves. This implies that Iran’s brinkmanship – walking up to red lines but not blatantly crossing them – is likely to continue. We may see Iran accumulate more high-enriched uranium or deploy advanced centrifuges in new underground halls, but perhaps refrain from assembling a weapon or conducting a test, preserving ambiguity. Such ambiguity is strategically rational: it keeps opponents unsure (enhancing deterrence) but stops short of the provocation that a declared nuclear weapons status would bring[1].

Deterrence dynamics (2025–2030): In a scenario where Iran remains a threshold nuclear state, deterrence in the region becomes more multi-layered. Vertical escalation (nuclear use) is deterred by the certainty of devastating retaliation from Israel or the United States – a reality all sides understand[8]. Horizontal escalation (expanding conflicts geographically or with proxies) will continue to be Iran’s preferred arena, but even here, Iran’s direct missile attack on Israel in April 2024[15] showed a new boldness, likely motivated by confidence in its deterrent posture (and perhaps an assessment that Israel was tied down with other conflicts). We can expect Iran to calibrate carefully: it might retaliate directly to limited strikes (as it did against U.S. forces after Soleimani’s killing in 2020), but it will try to avoid mass-casualty actions that compel an overwhelming response. For their part, Israel and the U.S. will aim to deter Iran’s breakout or aggression through explicit red lines and military readiness. The U.S.’s enhanced force deployments in the Gulf in 2025 (carriers, overflight of strategic bombers) are meant to communicate that any dash to a bomb or attack on neighbors will be met decisively. It’s a classic deterrence signaling game: Iran brandishes its potential (missiles, enrichment) to deter attack, while the U.S. and Israel brandish their might to deter Iran from going nuclear or attacking allies[3]. So long as communication channels and intelligence remain good, each side can avoid misreading the other’s signals. However, as Iran reduces IAEA transparency[13], the risk of miscalculation increases – e.g., Israel might suspect Iran is covertly weaponizing and consider a preemptive strike, even if Iran hasn’t actually decided to build a bomb.

Role of great powers: Russia and China will be key stabilizers (or spoilers) in this outlook. Both will likely continue to restrain Iran moderately – encouraging it to not weaponize overtly – while also restraining Western punitive actions through diplomatic vetoes[16]. For instance, China’s mediation in 2025 talks signals it wants a peaceful resolution[6], and Russia’s caution about a nuclear Iran (not wanting a competitor in its backyard[3]) means Moscow might quietly dissuade Tehran from crossing the threshold. Yet, if confrontation escalates, Russia and China could also complicate U.S. responses (e.g., by opposing UN sanctions or providing Iran with economic lifelines). Ideally, a concert of great powers could impose a new containment regime: e.g., a tacit understanding that Iran can have civilian nuclear tech but no bombs, enforced by multilateral pressure. But with U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations tense, their cooperation on Iran is limited. Therefore, the balance likely tilts toward ad hoc coordination – like the Beijing meeting in March 2025[6] – rather than a unified front. This multi-polar involvement actually provides Iran some buffer (no total isolation as North Korea faces), which in turn could embolden Tehran to hold firm on brinkmanship, confident that Moscow and Beijing “have its back” enough to prevent strangulation[3].

Escalation or accommodation: Between now and 2030, two broad trajectories loom: deterrence could hold and lead to a form of cold peace where Iran stabilizes at threshold nuclear status under a long-term interim deal, or deterrence could break down via missteps, leading to escalation – economic (snapback of full UN sanctions) or military (strikes and war). The integrated outlook must consider triggers for each. A trigger for accommodation might be a successful negotiation by 2025-26 where Iran agrees to freeze enrichment and the U.S. eases key sanctions (the current talks hint at this possibility[16]). If such an understanding takes hold, a tense but more predictable period could ensue: Iran’s program capped at say 60%, IAEA monitoring somewhat restored, and a degree of regional de-escalation, as seen by the UAE and Saudi re-engaging Iran diplomatically. This “cold peace” wouldn’t solve underlying distrust but would buy time and avoid war – a managed deterrence environment akin to the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, where both sides accept mutual deterrence logic. In this scenario, we might see continued proxy contests and sanctions cat-and-mouse, but no direct military showdown, and potentially the Gulf entering a nuclear restraint regime (Saudi holds off going nuclear as long as Iran remains at threshold, not beyond).

Conversely, a trigger for escalation could be a collapse of talks combined with provocative nuclear advances – e.g., Iran enriching to 90% or expelling inspectors. That could prompt the E3 to trigger UN snapback sanctions in late 2025[5], isolating Iran further. Iran might retaliate by leaving the NPT, a drastic step that would signal it’s racing for actual weapons. At that point, Israel and the U.S. would face a fateful choice: strike or tolerate. Given stated red lines, the likely outcome would be an Israeli strike (with or without overt U.S. support). That would initiate the war scenario previously outlined – a lose-lose spiral. Both Iran and its adversaries understand this outcome is extremely costly to all, which is precisely why deterrence is likely to prevail short of those extreme triggers. Each actor will try to avoid boxing the other into a corner. For example, if Iran does enrich to weapons-grade, it might do so in small quantities or quietly, to avoid a public casus belli. Similarly, Israel might hold off bombing if it believes the U.S. could still coerce Iran economically or covertly sabotage enough to delay things.

2025–2030 projection: If rationality guides decisions, the most plausible trajectory is a continued standoff marked by periodic flare-ups but no full-scale war or dramatic diplomatic breakthrough – essentially, a protracted deterrence equilibrium. Iran may incrementally improve its nuclear and missile capabilities (more advanced centrifuges, perhaps fielding more accurate long-range missiles). The U.S. and Israel will improve their defenses and detection (anti-missile systems, cyber operations to spy on Iran’s program). A cyber shadow war will likely intensify – Stuxnet-like attacks or Israeli clandestine ops trying to slow Iran without kinetic strikes, and Iranian cyber retaliations. This under-the-threshold conflict can be part of the deterrence dance, where each side pushes without triggering an overt war. The challenge will be managing proxy conflicts (in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq) that could escalate. For instance, if Hezbollah and Israel go to war (not unlikely in the next few years given tensions on the northern Israeli border), Iran’s degree of involvement will test how far deterrence holds. Would Israel strike IRGC targets in Iran if Hezbollah rains missiles? Possibly, which could then provoke Iranian ballistic missile volleys at Israel. Even if nuclear arms aren’t used, conventional escalation could be severe, and the presence of nuclear capabilities in the background would make all parties more cautious about ultimate escalation (a situation akin to how India and Pakistan have fought limited skirmishes under a nuclear overhang).

In essence, the region will resemble a Cold War-style balance, with Iran and an unofficial U.S.-Israel-Arab coalition as the two poles. Diplomacy will still occur (hotlines or quiet U.S.-Iran channels to avoid accidents, negotiations on prisoner swaps or limited accords), but deep trust is unlikely. The outlook is not a resolution of the conflict, but a management of it. The risk of miscalculation remains – particularly if either side underestimates the other’s resolve. For example, Iran’s regime, facing internal pressures or emboldened by what it sees as U.S. reluctance for war, might go one step too far thinking it can get away with it. Conversely, an Israeli leadership might overestimate its ability to surgically knock out Iran’s program without broad war. Preventing those miscalculations requires clear communication of red lines. So far, all sides have communicated fairly clearly (the U.S. has said rejoining JCPOA isn’t indefinite, Israel has conveyed it will strike if Iran gets too close, Iran has warned hitting its nuclear sites will mean war on multiple fronts[2]).

Conclusion: Iran’s nuclear brinkmanship—grounded in a realist pursuit of security and leverage—appears set to continue in the coming years, restrained by the counter-balancing forces that vigilantly oppose it. It is a tense equilibrium, but not necessarily an irrational or unstable one if all players remain level-headed. The history of the Cold War shows that bitter foes can avoid Armageddon through credible deterrence, backchannel dialogue, and the understanding of mutual ruin if war erupts. Iran and its adversaries now face a similar learning curve. The strategic outlook for 2025–2030 is thus likely to be characterized by deterrence and containment, “cold” confrontation through sanctions and proxies, and sporadic diplomatic engagements to prevent the cold war from turning hot. Barring a drastic change—like a new revolution in Iran or a wildly bellicose turn in either Washington or Tehran—rational actors on all sides will probably find it in their interest to live with a simmering stalemate rather than to die in a reckless blaze. It is a volatile peace, but a peace nonetheless, grounded in the sobering recognition that a direct war could be catastrophic for all. The world will have to navigate this twilight state of neither war nor peace, hoping that over time, incremental trust or internal change might finally break the cycle and yield a more permanent solution to Iran’s nuclear quandary.

References:

1. Z. Yazdanshenas & A. Saleh, “Iran’s new nuclear policy between deterrence and pragmatism.” Middle East Institute, May 9, 2024. mei.edumei.edu
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